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Reviving Judicial Gatekeeping of
Aggregation: Scrutinizing the Merits
on Class Certification
Richard Marcus*
INTRODUcTION
Judges have always been gatekeepers, but their gatekeeping tasks
have changed a good deal over time.' Perhaps the most famous cur-
rent "gatekeeping" function of judges involves their evaluation of pro-
posed expert testimony. In 1993, the Supreme Court's Daubert
decision commanded district judges to become "gatekeepers" who
scrutinize the validity of scientific expert testimony,2 and it has since
extended this gatekeeping responsibility to include all kinds of expert
testimony,3 while also recognizing that courts of appeals should review
district court decisions of this sort under the deferential abuse of dis-
cretion standard.4
Gatekeeping is often a difficult task, frequently in ways that law
school and legal practice did not prepare judges to perform. On re-
* Horace 0. Coil ('57) Chair in Litigation, University of California, Hastings College of
the Law. The author serves as Associate Reporter of the Advisory Committee of Civil Rules,
and had a role in drafting the 2003 amendments to Rule 23. I am indebted to Mary Kay Kane
for reading and commenting on a draft of this Article, and to the participants in The George
Washington University Law School's conference on complex litigation (March 12, 2010) for com-
ments on the thesis. None of those people has any responsibility for my comments, however; I
am speaking here solely for myself.
1 By "gatekeeper," I do not mean to limit my focus to judicial decisions at the outset of a
lawsuit. Rather, I focus more broadly on judicial decisions regulating the litigation process, in-
cluding joinder decisions (like class certification) and other decisions about what lawyers can do
in the conduct of a lawsuit, such as presentation of evidence, attorney's fee awards, etc. In each
of these situations, a judge ultimately must act as a gatekeeper by making a decision on whether
the lawyers will be permitted to do what they want to do. Often, these decisions move far
beyond the traditional task of "applying law to facts." See, e.g., Robin J. Effron, The Plaintiff
Neutrality Principle: Pleading Complex Litigation in the Era of Twombly and Iqbal, 51 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1997, 2043 (2010) (asserting that the "class certification procedure does provide a
second gatekeeping point for evaluating the concerns that drive many critics to label class ac-
tions as costly or difficult").
2 See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
3 See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999) (applying the gatekeeping re-
quirement to experience-based proposed testimony about the cause of a tire failure).
4 See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997) (holding that an abuse of discretion
standard should be used in reviewing district court rulings on admissibility of expert opinion
evidence).
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mand in Daubert, for example, Judge Kozinski of the Ninth Circuit
explained his diffidence as follows:
Our responsibility, then, unless we badly misread the Su-
preme Court's opinion, is to resolve disputes among
respected, well-credentialed scientists about matters squarely
within their expertise, in areas where there is no scientific
consensus as to what is and what is not "good science," and
occasionally to reject such expert testimony because it was
not "derived by the scientific method." Mindful of our posi-
tion in the hierarchy of the federal judiciary, we take a deep
breath and proceed with this heady task.5
Gatekeeping is central to litigation aggregation, and it is thus not
surprising to find that it is also central to the Principles of the Law of
Aggregate Litigation ("Principles"),6 which are the focus of this sym-
posium. The central gatekeeping question, of course, is whether ag-
gregation should occur and, if so, how broadly. Recently, judicial
attitudes toward how to perform that gatekeeping function in class
actions have shifted significantly. It has long been recognized that
class certification is preeminently important.7 Denial of class certifica-
tion can be the "death knell" of the case, and a grant supposedly can
create such a death threat to defendant that settlement is her only
option.8
5 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1316 (9th Cir. 1995).
6 PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIG. (2010). A catalogue of all the places
where the Principles call for judicial gatekeeping would be too difficult, but a sampler seems
worthwhile. See, e.g., id. § 2.02(d) (the court should adopt a plan for "controlled discovery" to
inform its aggregation decision); id. § 2.06(a) (the court must decide all questions upon which
class certification depends); id. § 2.12(b) (the court must resolve any pertinent dispute); id. § 3.01
(the court may approve proposed class action settlements only if it finds them fair); id. § 3.02(b)
(court approval required for settlement of individual claims of proposed class representatives);
id. § 3.05(a) (the court must make findings regarding a proposed settlement); id. § 3.08 (the
court sets fees for attorneys, including objectors' attorneys); id. § 3.13 (general authority of the
court over attorney's fee awards).
7 See, e.g., ARTHUR R. MILLER, AN OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL CLASS ACIoNs: PAST, PRE-
SENT, AND FUTURE (1977), which explains as follows:
In terms of the dynamics and economics of class actions, and most particularly in a
Rule 23(b)(3) damage case, the lawyers believe that whether the case will be certi-
fied as a class action under Rule 23(c)(1) is the single most important issue in the
case. All the lawyers' weapons and all the litigants' resources tend to be mobilized
to deal with that question. Defense lawyers believe that their ability to settle the
case advantageously or to convince the plaintiff to abandon the case depends on
blocking certification. Conversely, plaintiffs' lawyers believe that their ability to
obtain a large settlement turns on securing certification.
Id. at 12; see also Developments in the Law-Class Actions, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1318, 1423 (1976)
(describing class certification as potentially a "cataclysmic, all-or-nothing event").
8 See, e.g., In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1298-300 (7th Cir. 1995) (Pos-
325
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Despite certification's centrality, until recently federal judges
have approached their gatekeeping tasks in deciding whether to cer-
tify with one hand tied behind their backs because they have regarded
the Supreme Court's 1974 Eisen decision 9 as forbidding consideration
of anything bearing on the merits of the case at that point. Although
the merits of class certification might sometimes involve issues that
are as challenging as the ones Judge Kozinski described above,1 0 in
general, the questions posed by class certification are of the sort that
judges are familiar with resolving in litigation. Thus, this limitation on
certification scrutiny has been questioned almost from the time Eisen
was decided, and it has recently been jettisoned, in part due to the
2003 amendments to Rule 23.
This is a major development." Professor Mullenix, for example,
has described the Third Circuit's leading decision on evaluating the
merits-In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litigationl2-as potentially
the most influential class certification decision since the Supreme
Court's 1997 ruling invalidating a nationwide asbestos settlement
class.13 Already this trend has been denounced in the law reviews. 14
ner, C.J.) (arguing that class certification converted this products liability litigation from being a
case involving significant exposure to being a "bet the company" case). But see In re Visa
Check/Mastermoney Antitrust Litig., 280 F.3d 124, 145 (2d Cir. 2001) (Sotomayor, J.) ("The
effect of certification on parties' leverage in settlement negotiations is a fact of life for class
action litigants. While the sheer size of the class in this case may enhance this effect, this alone
cannot defeat an otherwise proper certification.") For a thorough critique of the view that class
certification results in overkill, see Charles Silver, "We're Scared to Death": Class Certification
and Blackmail, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1357 (2003).
9 Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
10 See Richard J. Arsenault & John Randall Whaley, Will Daubert Challenge Your Class
Certification?, TRIAL, July 2009, at 38 (discussing scrutiny of expert opinions during class
certification).
11 For another examination of this development, stressing the way in which increased scru-
tiny of class certification can focus on difficult issues raised by the underlying substantive law,
see Richard A. Nagareda, Class Certification in the Age of Aggregate Proof, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV.
97 (2008).
12 In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305 (3d Cir. 2008). This case is dis-
cussed infra text accompanying notes 157-84.
13 See Linda Mullenix, Class Certification, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 26, 2009, at 9 (describing Hy-
drogen Peroxide, and referring to Amchem Products Inc., v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997)).
14 See Michael J. Kaufman & John M. Wunderlich, The Unjustified Judicial Creation of
Class Certification Merits Trials in Securities Fraud Actions, 43 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 323 (2010);
Steig D. Olson, "Chipping Away": The Misguided Trend Toward Resolving Merits Disputes as
Part of the Class Certification Calculus, 43 U.S.F. L. REV. 935, 939 (2009) (arguing that recent
developments are "making class certification a more onerous and less efficient process for liti-
gants and the court"); see also Joshua P. Davis & Eric L. Cramer, Of Vulnerable Monopolists?:
Questionable Innovation in the Standard for Class Certification in Antitrust Cases, 41 RUTGERS
L.J. (forthcoming 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1542143.
[Vol. 79:324
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This Article places this development in the context of judicial
gatekeeping more generally, borrowing from Professor Molot's recent
recognition that different features of judicial management of civil liti-
gation place varying stress on the traditional judicial function.15 Part I
begins by noting the longstanding role of judges in fashioning and ap-
proving aggregation of litigation, and then Part II examines the 1966
amendment to Rule 23 and the constricted attitude toward certifica-
tion that resulted from the Eisen decision against that background.
Part III then contrasts that constricted gatekeeping role in regard to
class certification with the steadily broadening gatekeeping required
of judges in a variety of areas in which they are asked to perform tasks
much further from traditional adjudication-including the handling of
important aspects of class action practice-and Part IV finds that the
recent embrace of merits scrutiny in relation to class certification is
something of a "back to basics" development. Finally, Part V reflects
briefly on where this development may lead.
I. AGGREGATION GATEKEEPING
Aggregation generally describes the combination of claims within
one litigation; even allowing a single plaintiff to combine claims on
differing legal grounds growing out of a specific incident against a sin-
gle defendant involves what is in some senses an "aggregation" deci-
sion. At one time, the common law did not allow such combination
because it depended on use of separate writs. We have, of course, left
that restrictive attitude far behind with modern joinder provisions
such as Rule 18, which permits a plaintiff to combine all claims it has
against the same defendant.1 6 Similar permissiveness is integral to
Rule 20, which allows plaintiffs to sue in combination, or to sue multi-
ple defendants, whenever their claims arise out of the same transac-
tion or occurrence, so long as the claims raise common questions.17 It
enables party aggregation far more important than the claim aggrega-
tion permitted by Rule 18.
Whether to permit aggregation involves a decision that can be
made in gross or case by case. Inevitably, it depends upon a judgment
combining considerations of efficiency and fairness.18 A subsidiary
15 Jonathan T. Molot, An Old Judicial Role for a New Litigation Era, 113 YALE L.J. 27,
46-58 (2003).
16 FED. R. Civ. P. 18.
17 See id. 20(a).
18 See generally Richard L. Marcus, Cure-Allfor an Era of Dispersed Litigation? Toward a
Maximalist Use of the Multidistrict Litigation Panel's Transfer Power, 82 TUL. L. REv. 2245,
2250-58 (2008) (examining policy tensions presented by aggregation decisions).
327
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question is to determine who should make the aggregation decision
and when.
For conventional party joinder, the modern approach has been
made in gross, and leaves the first move to the litigants; plaintiffs can
band together and sue together, and can sue many defendants in a
single suit. Defendants can similarly expand the cast of litigants by
adding parties to counterclaims 9 or making third-party claims.20 True,
other parties can object to such maneuvers and seek a court ruling
that the proposed aggregation does not conform to the prevailing rule
or that it should be undone even if initially permitted by the joinder
rule, 21 but that is the exception, and the onus rests to a significant
extent on the objecting party to show that the other side exceeded the
broad joinder permission in the rules. Gatekeeping is thus the excep-
tion and not the rule for party joinder, as it is for claim joinder.
Aggregation does not stop with joinder, however. Another im-
portant version is consolidation of separate cases. Consolidation is
"[o]ne of the earliest examples of case management based on inherent
authority."22 We were assured long ago that consolidation "does not
merge the suits into a single cause, or change the rights of the parties,
or make those who are parties in one suit parties in another," 23 but the
likelihood there will be a consolidated complaint, lead or liaison coun-
sel will be appointed, and a combined or "global" settlement will re-
sult makes that assurance ring somewhat hollow. On its face, Rule
42(a) seems to permit consolidation even in some instances in which
initial joinder under Rule 20(a) would not be proper, because it does
not require that the claims arise out of the same transaction or occur-
rence so long as they involve a common question.
Multidistrict consolidation may move a step further. It surely
moves a step further by permitting combination for pretrial purposes
of cases from throughout the federal judicial system, including "tag-
along" cases filed after the initial decision to "centralize" (the Judicial
Panel on Multidistrict Litigation's favored term for what it does24) the
19 FED. R. Civ. P. 13(h).
20 Id. 14(a).
21 See, e.g., id. 20(b) (permitting the court to separate claims even though they have been
properly joined under Rule 20(a)).
22 Daniel J. Meador, Inherent Judicial Authority in the Conduct of Civil Litigation, 73 TEX.
L. REV. 1805, 1807 (1995).
23 Johnson v. Manhattan Ry. Co., 289 U.S. 479, 496-97 (1933).
24 See John G. Heyburn II, A View from the Panel: Part of the Solution, 82 TUL. L. REV.
2225, 2227 n.12 (2008) (noting that the Panel refers to its efforts as leading to centralization of
litigation).
328 [Vol. 79:324
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litigation before a given judge. In at least some instances, it involves
combination of cases that almost surely could not be combined under
Rule 20.25
The point here is not to raise questions about aggressive combi-
nation of separate cases but to contrast the method for achieving ag-
gregation with initial joinder decisions by individual litigants. These
combination decisions depend upon gatekeeping by judges, who alone
have the power to consolidate. At least in the instance of the Judicial
Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, moreover, these decisions arguably
are made by judges who are favorably inclined toward consolidation
and result in assigning the cases to transferee judges who also are re-
ceptive to combined resolution.2 6 Whatever the merit of those pos-
sibilities, however, there is no question that combination in these
situations turns on judicial decision. That decision, in turn, is in-
formed in large measure by litigation considerations of a sort judges
have traditionally addressed, such as efficient discovery and fair com-
bined resolution of factual and legal issues.
Class actions fit into this overall scheme, and now depend quite
clearly on a judicial decision to combine. Much as lawyers can unilat-
erally effect a combination under Rule 20 by filing suit on behalf of
multiple plaintiffs, sometimes a great many plaintiffs, 27 they cannot
create a class action without the court's approval under current Rule
23-what we now call "class certification." But that term did not ap-
pear in Rule 23 until it was amended in 1998 to authorize discretion-
ary immediate appeals from that decision,28 and was first used by the
Supreme Court in 1975.29 Even then, it was criticized by some. In a
1977 decision, for example, Judge Schwarzer said that it is "at best
semantically misleading by implying a degree of finality and authority
25 Consider, for example, In re Aviation Prods. Liab. Litig., 347 F. Supp. 1401, 1402
(J.P.M.L. 1972) (combining suits involving claims about malperformance of two different makes
of helicopters because they both use the same sort of engine and the cases raise issues of the
"general condition and airworthiness" of this helicopter engine), and In re Asbestos Prods. Liab.
Litig. (No. VI), 771 F. Supp. 415, 424, 425 (J.P.M.L. 1991) (combining over 26,000 personal injury
asbestos claims from across the country). For discussions of the aggressive use of the combina-
tion power in these cases, see Marcus, supra note 18, at 2269, 2271-72.
26 See Marcus, supra note 18, at 2284-87.
27 See, e.g., Acuna v. Brown & Root, Inc., 200 F.3d 335, 337 (5th Cir. 2000) (suit brought
on behalf of more than 1000 plaintiffs against mining companies alleging personal injury from
defendants' uranium mining activities).
28 See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(f) (authorizing an immediate appeal "from an order granting or
denying class action certification").
29 See Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 414 (1975).
HeinOnline  -- 79 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 329 2010-2011
330 THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
which paragraph (c)(1) [of Rule 23] by its very language withholds
from a determination."30
One might conclude that, before 1966, there was no such thing as
a judicial determination whether cases were proper class actions. Cer-
tainly there are aspects of this history that seem to support that view.
Thus, the original Rule 23 was taken in large measure to focus on
"true" class actions, suggesting that cases simply were class actions
without the need for any action by the court so declaring. There was
no direction in the Rule for the court to make a special decision-
class certification-declaring that the case actually was a class action.
As Professor Bone put it in 1990, "[u]ntil the 1966 revision of Rule
23, ... there was no routine certification procedure for the representa-
tive suit."3'
Proceeding without gatekeeping could raise serious problems,
however. In Hansberry v. Lee,3 2 for example, the Supreme Court
found that foreclosing the Hansberrys' right to live in a previously
white neighborhood on the ground of an earlier class action judgment
enforcing a racially restrictive covenant violated their due process
rights.33 Seemingly any moderately careful scrutiny of the propriety of
treating the earlier case as a class action using the criteria of the cur-
rent Rule 23 would have required the court to confront the manifest
impropriety of binding all by this decree. Yet it does not appear that
any such scrutiny ever occurred; rather, it seems that the statement by
the plaintiff in the complaint in the earlier case that she was suing "on
behalf of herself and on behalf of all other property owners" in the
district sufficed by itself to lead to a binding class action judgment
under Illinois law.34 Perhaps gatekeeping was simply unknown in
class actions until 1966.
This suspicion does not survive much scrutiny, however. To the
contrary, the writing at the time the original version of Rule 23 was
adopted in 1938 shows that it was expected that judges would scruti-
nize the propriety of class action treatment before entering judg-
ment.35 Indeed, it seems that the resolution of the question whether a
30 Harriss v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 74 F.R.D. 24, 36 n.3 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
31 Robert G. Bone, Personal and Impersonal Litigative Forms: Reconceiving the History of
Adjudicative Representation, 70 B.U. L. REV. 213, 284 (1990).
32 Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940).
33 Id. at 45.
34 See Jay Tidmarsh, The Story of Hansberry: The Rise of the Modern Class Action, in
CIVIL PROCEDURE STORIEs 252-53 (Kevin M. Clermont ed., 2d ed. 2008).
35 See, e.g., William Wirt Blume, The "Common Questions" Principle in the Code Provi-
sion for Representative Suits, 30 Mica. L. REV. 878 (1932) (analyzing how courts decided if a
[Vol. 79:324
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case was a proper class action was enmeshed in the evaluation of the
merits of the case and emerged from the resolution of the merits. An
early Supreme Court decision somewhat confirms that appearance.
When it affirmed the binding effect of a decree in a "representative
suit" in 1853, the Supreme Court emphasized that "care must be taken
that persons are brought on the record fairly representing the interest
or right involved, so that it may be fully and honestly tried." 36 But it is
not at all clear how or when the court was to make this aggregation
decision. To some extent, it seems to have been dependent on the
merits-or at least the nature of the merits-of the suit.3 7 But argua-
bly the Court regarded the question as somewhat separate from the
merits by the time the case got to it since, after announcing that it was
a proper representative suit, Justice Nelson continued: "We will now
proceed to an examination of the merits of the case."3  Nonetheless,
there seems to have been no conscious attitude that aggregation deci-
sions were distinct from merits issues or had to precede attention to
the merits.
The original Rule 23 was based on this background; Charles
Clark introduced it in 1938 by saying that it "is not designed to state
new principles, but really to state the old equitable principle of class
suits in a way that adds clarity and will make it more usable." 39 Some-
thing like class certification has been with us for a long time, although
until 1966 it seemed to be closely connected to resolution of the merits
and did not have to be done at any particular time.
case should be regarded as a proper representative action); James William Moore & Marcus
Cohn, Federal Class Actions, 32 ILL. L. REV. 307, 308-14 (1938) (reporting that English chancel-
lors and American courts before 1938 would address the question whether suits were properly
maintainable as class actions); see also Developments in the Law-Multiparty Litigation in the
Federal Courts, 71 HARV. L. REv. 874, 934-39 (1958) (describing the issues critical to making a
class action decree binding).
36 Smith v. Swormstedt, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 288, 303 (1853).
37 Thus the Court explained its ruling upholding class treatment:
The case in hand illustrates the propriety and fitness of the rule [regarding repre-
sentative suits]. There are some fifteen hundred persons represented by the com-
plainants, and over double that number by the defendants. It is manifest that to
require all the parties to be brought upon the record, as is required in a suit at law,
would amount to a denial of justice.
Id.
38 Id.
39 Am. BAR Ass'N, PROCEEDINGS OF THE INSTITUTE ON FEDERAL RULES, CLEVELAND,
OHIO 263 (William W. Dawson ed., 1938). At page 264, Clark cites Moore & Cohn, supra note
35.
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II. THE 1966 COMPROMISE AND EISEN
The original categories of Rule 23-such as "true" class actions-
did not work. In 1962, the Advisory Committee undertook to revise
the Rule and ended up substituting functional certification criteria.
At the same time, it was able to deal with the reality that, in the words
of the Reporter, Professor Kaplan, the original Rule 23 did not "pa[y]
any attention to the details of the procedural management of class
actions." 40 That inattention to procedural detail may have reflected
the seeming attitude that class status was simply one of the issues in a
case that eventually had to be resolved, not that it required distinctive
or separate attention. The revised Rule did provide some directives,
although in a somewhat sketchy fashion, subsequently expanded sub-
stantially in 2003.41
One aspect of "procedural management" of class actions that the
rulemakers wanted to address was "one-way intervention." A num-
ber of courts handling "spurious" class actions under the 1938 version
of the Rule had permitted intervention by class members after a de-
fendant's liability was determined. 4 2 This was "one-way" because the
spurious class action was not binding on any class members who did
not intervene; they could wait and see how the case came out and then
decide whether to join in. In view of the general requirement at the
time that collateral estoppel be mutual, one-way intervention seemed
unfair. To make the binding effect bilateral, however, required a pro-
cess that protected the rights of class members; the opt-out opportu-
nity was selected as sufficient for that purpose.4 3
Making this change work required attending also to the question
of decision sequence. Unless the question of class status, and the deci-
sion to opt out, were resolved before the case was decided on the mer-
its, the decision to opt out itself might be viewed as akin to one-way
intervention; indeed, it could result in one-way intervention by default
should the defendant be found liable because all those who did not
opt out would be included and eligible for the benefits of the suit.
Rule 23(c)(1) therefore said that the court should make the determi-
nation whether the case was a proper class action "as soon as practica-
40 Benjamin Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (1), 81 HARV. L. REv. 356, 379 (1967).
41 See infra text accompanying notes 112-44 for discussion of the 2003 changes.
42 See John K. Rabiej, The Making of Class Action Rule 23-What Were We Thinking?, 24
Miss. C. L. REV. 323, 336-39 (2005).
43 For discussion of the due process need for the opt-out right, see 7AA CHARLES ALAN
wRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE
§§ 1789-1789.1 (3d ed. 2005).
[Vol. 79:324
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ble," in order that the court resolve this issue before deciding the
merits.44 But the Rule permitted the initial determination to be "con-
ditional," a point emphasized in the 1966 Committee Note. 45 Thus,
although courts were for the first time required to make their
gatekeeping decisions about whether cases were proper class actions
separately, early in the proceedings, they could hedge their bets and
revisit the initial decision later.
This was the setting for Eisen, which was filed in the district court
almost immediately after the 1966 amendments to Rule 23 became
effective. Because the Supreme Court's decision has assumed such
importance, it is useful to recount what led up to it in some detail.
Plaintiffs asserted price-fixing claims against two "odd-lot" dealers for
stock exchange trades involving trading other than in 100-share lots.
For these transactions, there was an additional charge, and plaintiffs
claimed that these two dealers had conspired to monopolize trading in
odd lots and to overcharge for such trades. Defendants moved under
Rule 23(c)(1) for a determination that it was not a proper class
action.46
Barely three months after the amended Rule 23 went into effect,
District Judge Tyler decided that Eisen was not a proper class action.
He built on pre-1966 class action gatekeeping, reasoning that "it may
be at least generally helpful to consider some of the judge-made re-
quirements and prerequisites for maintaining a spurious class action
under the old Rule in order to determine if Eisen has successfully met
those specifically set forth in subparagraphs (a) and (b)(3) of the
amended Rule." 47 He found that the amended Rule did not add any-
thing new: "[A]s I read the above-cited pre-July 1, 1966, cases and
others similar to them, substantially all of the specifically stated pre-
44 See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1), 308 U.S. 689 (1939) (amended 1966). This sequencing
imperative could be contrasted with the rule that a court may not reach the merits until it de-
cides whether it has jurisdiction. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83 (1998)
(holding that the court may not address the merits of a suit before resolving disputes about its
subject matter jurisdiction).
45 See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1) advisory committee's note, reprinted in 39 F.R.D. 95, 104
(1966):
An order embodying a determination can be conditional; the court may rule, for
example, that a class action may be maintained only if the representation is im-
proved through intervention of additional parties of a stated type. A determination
once made can be altered or amended before the decision on the merits if, upon
fuller development of the facts, the original determination appears unsound.
Id.
46 Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 41 F.R.D. 147, 148 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
47 Id. at 149.
333
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requisites and requirements now found in amended Rule 23(a) and
(b) were deemed essential for maintaining a spurious class action
under old Rule 23."48 But the requirement of notice to the class was
new, and Judge Tyler found this to be "the most serious difficulty with
plaintiff's claim to be able to properly protect the interests of the
class" because all plaintiff proposed to do was to place advertisements
in the press and provide notices to stock exchange firms.4 9 Citing the
tremendous size of the proposed class (then estimated to include 3.75
million people),50 the Judge added that he was concerned that com-
mon questions did not prevail. He decided that it was not a proper
class action.5' Judge Tyler may, then, have been the first judicial gate-
keeper under the amended Rule 23.
The Second Circuit, noting that it was making the first appellate
interpretation of the amended Rule 23,52 reversed by a 2-1 vote.
Speaking through Judge Medina, the majority recognized that the new
Rule required enhanced gatekeeping-"a court must now carefully
scrutinize the adequacy of representation in all class actions."53 In
particular, due to the need to vindicate small claims insufficient to
support individual litigation, Judge Medina said that "we hold that the
new rule should be given a liberal rather than a restrictive interpreta-
tion."54 Judge Tyler's dismissal of the class aspects "out of hand"
therefore was wrong.55 Moreover, the district judge's concerns about
the predominance of common questions were unwarranted: "[A]t this
early stage of the proceedings, we find there has been an adequate
demonstration that common questions of law or fact predominate
over individual questions." 5 6 Although the majority was uncertain
how to solve the notice problem on the existing record, Judge Medina
suggested that
[i]t may be that in some situations it is better at the outset to
decide that the proceedings may be prosecuted as a class ac-
tion and leave for later resolution some of the debatable
matters, such as the sufficiency of the representation or the
48 Id.
49 Id. at 151.
50 Id. at 151 n.2.
51 Id. at 152.
52 Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 560 (2d Cir. 1968) ("While the new concepts
incorporated in the rule have not as yet been passed upon by any federal Court of Appeals, they
have received somewhat less than an enthusiastic reception in the District Courts.").
53 Id. at 562.
54 Id. at 563.
55 Id.
56 Id. at 566.
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notice to be given, or the feasibility of problems of judicial
administration.57
Thus, the majority embraced a "liberal" interpretation of the new
Rule 23, favoring certification in close cases with later reconsideration
if appropriate. Over the strong dissent of Chief Judge Lumbard, 8 the
panel remanded to Judge Tyler and retained jurisdiction to review
what he did with the case, having already declared that the predomi-
nance requirement was satisfied.
Not one to shirk his duty, Judge Tyler embarked on an odyssey of
discovery and hearings to develop a solution to the problems
presented in the case, an effort that years later prompted Professor
Landers (who knew what was coming) to begin an important article
about Rule 23 by exclaiming "Poor Judge Tyler!" 59 The District Judge
initially recognized that he was "unable to conceive of a solution of
this extraordinary issue upon the present record."60 Accordingly, he
directed the parties to develop and present to him the information he
needed to resolve problems of manageability and notice.61 Six months
later, he announced that he had "sufficient information to make all of
the required findings for the class action determination." 62 There fol-
lowed twenty-one findings of fact upon which the Judge based his con-
clusions that plaintiff would provide adequate representation, that
some sort of aggregate computation of damages to the class could be
utilized (what came to be called a "fluid recovery"), and that the "ex-
pensive and stringent" notice requirements of Rule 23(c)(2) could un-
dermine the public policy objectives of the class action device. 63
To determine which side should bear the cost of notice, Judge
Tyler decided to follow the lead of Judge Weinstein6 4 and hold a pre-
liminary hearing within sixty days on the merits to inform his decision
on allocation of costs:
This should allow sufficient time for minimum necessary dis-
covery and at the same time prevent the proceedings from
continuing longer than absolutely necessary. The hearing it-
self should be brief, and the parties are encouraged to submit
57 Id. at 570.
58 See id. at 570-72 (Lumbard, C.J., dissenting).
59 Jonathan M. Landers, Of Legalized Blackmail and Legalized Theft: Consumer Class
Actions and the Substance-Procedure Dilemma, 47 S. CAL. L. REv. 842, 842 (1974).
60 Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 50 F.R.D. 471, 472 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
61 See id. at 472-73.
62 Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 52 F.R.D. 253, 256 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
63 Id. at 256-69.
64 See Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 501 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
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whatever evidence they deem relevant in the form of stipula-
tions, affidavits or depositions to the extent that they are
practicable. Actual testimony should be required only from
very important witnesses. 65
This approach seemed preferable to Judge Tyler to holding a trial and
making a final decision of the merits before notice was sent.66
A year later, Judge Tyler ruled on the basis of his "mini-hearing,"
which involved "voluminous documentary evidence" but no live testi-
mony, that the defendants should bear ninety percent of the cost of
giving notice. 67 He made twenty-three findings of fact, although he
specified that these findings were "only for the stated purpose of the
hearing: the allocation of the cost of notice." 68 Based on the findings
of fact, he reached nine conclusions of law, leading to the overall con-
clusion that the plaintiffs were likely to prevail under a per se antitrust
rule forbidding fixing prices. 69
Another year later, the Second Circuit reversed Judge Tyler
again.70 The panel seemed to have had second thoughts about its ini-
tial preference for a "liberal" reading of the Rule.71 It noted that
65 Eisen, 52 F.R.D. at 272.
66 Id. at 271 ("1 have also determined that a preliminary hearing is superior to other possi-
ble procedures. One such alternative would be to allow the action to proceed to a determination
on the merits before assessing the costs of notice and send notice only if plaintiff is successful.").
The Judge rejected this idea because it "is at least theoretically contrary to the language of Rule
23 calling for an early determination of the class action question." Id.
67 Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 54 F.R.D. 565, 567 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
68 Id. at 567. The Judge noted that plaintiffs contended that the case was ripe for summary
judgment, but said that he would not "treat this case on the merits at this juncture." Id. at 567
n.1.
69 Id. at 570-73.
70 Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 479 F.2d 1005, 1018 (2d Cir. 1973).
71 For many judges, initial enthusiasm for class actions after the 1966 amendments gave
way to judicial skepticism about them by the mid-1970s. The Eisen Second Circuit panel may
have been ahead of the curve on this subject. For discussion of this development, see Arthur R.
Miller, Of Frankenstein Monsters and Shining Knights: Myth, Reality, and the "Class Action
Problem," 92 HARV. L. REv. 664 (1979), describing what Professor Miller called the "first
phase" of judicial experience under amended Rule 23:
Cases often were certified as class actions on the basis of rather conclusory asser-
tions of compliance with rule 23(a) and (b). Settlements were sometimes approved
without an in-depth analysis of the underlying merits of the claim, the economics of
the litigation, or the feasibility of distributing the funds to class members. In addi-
tion, fee petitions were not scrutinized as carefully as experience now suggests they
should have been. Enthusiasm for the class action fed upon itself, and the proce-
dure fell victim to overuse by its champions and misuse by some who sought to
exploit it for reasons external to the merits of the case. Mistakes, in most cases
honest mistakes of faith, were made. By the end of the first phase, class action
practice had been given a very black eye.
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"[c]lass actions have sprouted and multiplied like the leaves of the
green bay tree"72 and opined that many of those decisions showed
"the lack of an adequate remedy under existing laws" for situations
involving millions of claimants, which the panel viewed as a problem
for Congress.7 3 Turning to the case before it, the panel found Judge
Tyler's laborious preliminary evaluation of the merits improper:
No provision is made in amended Rule 23 for any such mini,
preliminary or other hearing on the merits. It does violence
to the whole concept of summary judgment, and cannot be
reconciled with the requirement in Rule 23 that "as soon as
practicable after the commencement of the action" the ques-
tion of class suit vel non be decided. 74
Judge Tyler's reliance on a fluid recovery approach to sidestep
problems of manageability was similarly improper, and, given the
case's unmanageability, "a ruling should have been made forthwith
dismissing the case as a class action. This dismissal could have saved
several years of hard work by the judge and the lawyers and wholly
unnecessary expense running into large figures." 7  Of course, poor
Judge Tyler had dismissed the class action allegations forthwith sev-
eral years before, only to be reversed for doing so by this same panel.
On petition for rehearing en banc, a majority of the judges voted
against rehearing in confidence that the Supreme Court would take
the case.76
The Supreme Court did take the case, and decided it another year
later-eight years after it was originally filed.77 After detailing the
case's tortured path through the lower courts, the Court held that in-
dividual notice to each identifiable class member is required in a Rule
23(b)(3) class action, no matter how small the claim, and that the
mini-hearing Judge Tyler held was improper:
We find nothing in either the language or the history of Rule
23 that gives a court any authority to conduct a preliminary
inquiry into the merits of a suit in order to determine
whether it may be maintained as a class action. Indeed, such
Id. at 678.
72 Eisen, 479 F.2d at 1018.
73 Id. at 1019.
74 Id. at 1016.
75 Id. at 1017.
76 See id. at 1020 (Kaufman, J.) ("I vote against en banc, not because I believe this case is
unimportant, but because the case is of such extraordinary consequence that I am confident the
Supreme Court will take this matter under its certiorari jurisdiction.").
77 Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
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a procedure contravenes the Rule by allowing a representa-
tive plaintiff to secure the benefits of a class action without
first satisfying the requirements for it. He is thereby allowed
to obtain a determination on the merits of the claims ad-
vanced on behalf of the class without any assurance that a
class action may be maintained. This procedure is directly
contrary to the command of subdivision (c)(1) that the court
determine whether a suit denominated a class action may be
maintained as such "[a]s soon as practicable after the com-
mencement of [the] action . . . ."78
It added that such a preliminary determination of the merits would be
unfair to the defendant "since of necessity it is not accompanied by
the traditional rules and procedures applicable to civil trials."79
This first effort by the Supreme Court to handle the class action
problem has not earned good grades. The requirement of individual
notice, for example, has been regularly denounced as pointless.so The
seeming prohibition on consideration of the merits, however, could
intrude more deeply into the class certification process. Carried to its
utmost, it might insulate any case against challenge on the merits until
class certification could be resolved, a prospect that might understand-
ably fill many with dread when the slog to class certification might be
long and costly and the path to merits resolution relatively short and
direct. Meanwhile, the commitment to mutuality in application of col-
lateral estoppel-an important support for the effort to obtain an
early decision on class certification in the first place-was largely
abandoned except for "wait and see" plaintiffs. 1 Despite those devel-
opments, courts obliged to adhere to the most rigid version of Eisen's
78 Id. at 177-78 (alterations in original).
79 Id. at 178.
80 See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs' Attorney's Role in
Class Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58
U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 27-28 (1991). Professors Macey and Miller assert:
There is little to recommend the Eisen rule from the standpoint of economic analy-
sis. The pecuniary costs of notice in large class actions can run well over half a
million dollars. In addition, the costs of identifying absent class members and pre-
paring the notice, as well as the opportunity costs to class members of interpreting
the notice, can be substantial. These costs would be justifiable if they were out-
weighed by compensating benefits that might exist in a case with substantial indi-
vidual claims. In the large-scale, small-claim class action, however, the benefits of
notice appear minimal at best. It is doubtful whether notice has any social utility
other than that of informing the class members of the claim. Most plaintiffs are
unlikely to place any significant value on such information.
Id.
81 See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 331-32 (1979) (directing that non-
mutual offensive use of collateral estoppel be permitted for those who are not "wait and see"
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decision sequence might forbid motions for summary judgment, or
even dismiss for failure to state a claim, until after making the decision
whether to certify a class.82 And in order to maintain some sense of
proportionality and hurry up the class certification process, they
would often attempt to limit discovery before class certification to
"class" issues, forbidding "merits" discovery.83
These efforts to avoid "merits" decisions could thus produce what
might be called a "Clockwork orange" 84 regime, imposing significant
rigidities on class action practice. Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp.,8 5 a
Third Circuit case decided shortly before the Supreme Court's Eisen
decision, illustrates one possible dilemma. Plaintiff credit card cus-
tomer filed a class action against defendant credit card issuer, claiming
that it did not adequately disclose its $15 annual fee as a finance
charge as required by the Truth in Lending Act. 86 Under the Act, a
borrower who proves a violation may recover twice the finance
charge, but not less than $100 nor more than $1000.7 Plaintiff sued on
behalf of some 700,000 cardholders, seeking an amount "substantially
in excess of Carte Blanche's net worth."88 But the Federal Reserve
Board later determined that annual fees should not be regarded as
finance charges subject to the disclosure requirement, and by the time
the appeal was heard, even plaintiff conceded that it was "a near cer-
tainty that no liability will be imposed with respect to that claim." 9
Nonetheless, rigidly adhering to Rule 23's commands, the district
court insisted that notice had to be sent to all class members. Carte
Blanche objected that giving notice would be catastrophic to it be-
cause, upon receipt of the notice, a substantial portion of its debtors
plaintiffs unless unfair to defendant); Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S.
313, 350 (1971) (authorizing defensive use of nonmutual collateral estoppel).
82 See Developments in the Law, supra note 7, at 1421 (describing post-Eisen lower court
decisions and observing that "[tihe rationale of these recent cases, if carried to its logical ex-
treme, would require certification to precede even motions made under rule 12(b)(6)").
83 See, e.g., Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Class Certification Based on Merits of the Claims, 69
TENN. L. REV. 1, 3 (2001) (reporting that "merits discovery in class suits usually is postponed
until after certification").
84 "Clockwork orange" is an old Cockney expression alluding to a force that overcomes
humans' exercise of free will through something like Pavlovian conditioning. In 1962, Anthony
Burgess borrowed the phrase for the title of his dystopian novella, A Clockwork Orange, and in
1971 Stanley Kubrick made a movie of the novella, released under the same name.
85 Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., 496 F.2d 747 (3d Cir. 1974).
86 Id. at 750.
87 Id. at 751.
88 Id.
89 Id. at 757 n.6.
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would withhold payments.90 It added that it might even be required to
file compulsory counterclaims against them.91 The district court certi-
fied the issue for interlocutory appeal.92
The Third Circuit decided the case en banc, and held that the
superiority requirement of Rule 23(b)(3) was not satisfied because a
test-case approach was an available and superior alternative to pro-
ceeding with the class action. Although Rule 23 said that class certifi-
cation must be decided "as soon as practicable," that directive meant
"in the light of the relevant rule 23(b)(3) factors of predominance and
superiority" and "not necessarily . . . at the outset of the lawsuit."93
Although judgment against Katz alone would not be binding on the
other proposed class members, Carte Blanche was "content to take its
chances on stare decisis rather than res judicata,"94 and the court felt
that, in light of the changing views on the mutuality requirement for
collateral estoppel, "a new look [should] be taken at the alternative of
a test case in lieu of an early class action determination."95 There
were three dissents.96
As Katz illustrates, a variety of disagreeable consequences could
follow from rigid adherence to a no-merits-evaluation-until-certifica-
tion, "Clockwork orange" sequencing of decisions. Arguably, defend-
ants could not even move to dismiss for failure to state a claim until
class certification was decided and the class was given notice. Even
more likely, they could be denied the opportunity to move for sum-
mary judgment since that would regularly depend on "merits" discov-
ery. And there was abundant opportunity to dispute the dividing line
between "merits" discovery and "class" discovery. As the Fifth Cir-
cuit put it in an en banc 1973 case, "[i]t is inescapable that in some
cases there will be overlap between the demands of [Rule] 23(a) and
90 Id. at 757.
91 Id. at 757-58; see also FED. R. Civ. P. 13(a) (requiring counterclaims arising out of the
same transaction as that sued upon by plaintiff). Whether the transaction involved would really
be the same is debatable, as is the question whether Rule 13(a) should apply to claims against
unnamed members of a class. See Joan Steinman, The Party Status of Absent Plaintiff Class
Members: Vulnerability to Counterclaims, 69 GEO. L.J. 1171 (1981) (discussing these issues).
92 Katz, 496 F.2d at 752.
93 Id. at 758.
94 Id. at 759.
95 Id. at 760.
96 Id. at 764 (Seitz, C.J., dissenting); id at 769 (Aldisert, J., dissenting); id. at 773 (Adams,
J., dissenting). Chief Judge Seitz argued in his dissent that the majority was guilty of "judicial
emasculation of Rule 23." Id. at 764 (Seitz, C.J., dissenting). He thought that the Supreme
Court's retreat from the mutuality of estoppel "does not appear to have killed mutuality out-
right," and therefore saw no reason for the majority to conclude that the Rule's "as soon as
practicable" directive "no longer performs a useful function." Id. at 766.
340 [Vol. 79:324
HeinOnline  -- 79 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 340 2010-2011
2011] REVIVING JUDICIAL GA TEKEEPING OF AGGREGATION
(b) and the question of whether [a] plaintiff can succeed on the
merits."97
The Supreme Court's rejection of merits scrutiny as a factor in
apportioning the cost of notice did not inevitably lead to unfortunate
results. For example, a Fifth Circuit case the Court quoted in Eisen
volunteered that Rule 12(b)(6) motions and Rule 56 motions could be
made before certification.98 And a contemporary survey of lawyers
indicated that, in appropriate cases, liability was addressed before
class certification. 99 But equally clearly, courts labored under uncer-
tainty about whether they could open the door to merits discussion or
merits discovery before granting or denying class certification.oo The
Supreme Court itself recognized in 1978 that "the class determination
generally involves considerations that are 'enmeshed in the factual
and legal issues comprising the plaintiffs' cause of action."'101 And in
1982, the Court rejected the Fifth Circuit's "across-the-board" rule
permitting any plaintiff alleging employment discrimination to obtain
class certification with regard to any allegedly discriminatory practices
of the employer, emphasizing that the court should scrutinize the evi-
dentiary showing that plaintiff will rely upon.102 But the shadow of
impropriety hung over aggressive precertification scrutiny of plain-
tiffs' claims in class actions even though the role of the court in a vari-
ety of other areas-including important class action issues-was
expanding.
97 Huff v. N.D. Cass Co. of Ala., 485 F.2d 710, 714 (5th Cir. 1973).
98 Miller v. Mackey Int'l, Inc., 452 F.2d 424, 428-29 (5th Cir. 1971) ("Purely vexatious
litigation could be halted by a Rule 12 motion to dismiss or a Rule 56 motion for summary
judgment.").
99 See Note, The Rule 23(b) (3) Class Action: An Empirical Study, 62 GEo. L.J. 1123, 1143
(1974) ("Scrutiny of the cases under study indicates that theory and practice differ on the ques-
tion whether consideration of the merits of a case should precede or follow consideration of class
certification."); see also id. at 1144 (reporting on a survey in which plaintiffs attorneys said they
thought it essential to present a strong case on the merits to obtain certification).
100 See, e.g., Wright v. Schock, 742 F.2d 541, 542 (9th Cir. 1984) (permitting defendant to
move for summary judgment before class certification); Stewart v. Winter, 669 F.2d 328, 331 (5th
Cir. 1982) ("[W]e think it imperative that the district court be permitted to limit pre-certification
discovery to evidence that, in its sound judgment, would be 'necessary or helpful' to the certifica-
tion decision." (footnote omitted)).
101 Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 469 (1978) (quoting Mercantile Nat'l Bank
v. Langdeau, 371 U.S. 555, 558 (1963)).
102 Gen. Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 155-60 (1982).
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III. GATEKEEPING UNBOUND-NONMERITS
JUDICIAL MANAGEMENT
While Eisen was frequently restraining judges from addressing
the merits of class actions before they decided whether to certify the
class, their larger gatekeeping role was expanding. Scrutiny of expert
evidence was only a small part of that gatekeeping activity.
As Professor Resnik has chronicled,103 the conception and reality
of the judicial function changed in the 1960s and 1970s. Professor
Chayes famously described the impact of that shift as resulting from
the emergence during that time of "public law litigation"-"[t]he
judge is the dominant figure in organizing and guiding the case."104
And the most prominent versions of 1960s public law litigation-judi-
cial decrees regarding the operation of public facilities, such as school
systems and prisons-surely pushed judges beyond traditional adjudi-
cation to a quasi-administrative role in relation to the institutions
under their supervision. A somewhat similar role might inevitably be
waiting for judges in handling class actions of all sorts;105 as the Su-
preme Court noted in 1985, "a class action resembles a quasi-adminis-
trative proceeding, conducted by a judge."106 Reacting to such
comments in 1969, Professor Kaplan, the Reporter who drafted the
1966 changes to Rule 23, commented:
We hear talk that it all belongs not to the courts but to ad-
ministrative agencies. But by hypothesis we are dealing with
cases that are not handled by existing agencies, and I do not
myself see any subversion of judicial process here but rather
a fine opportunity for its accommodation to new challenges
of the times.107
That "accommodation to new challenges of the times" expanded
during the 1980s and 1990s to include many additional tasks. Amend-
ments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1983 enshrined case
management in Rule 16, with scheduling orders required in most
103 See Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374 (1982).
104 See Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV.
1281, 1284 (1976).
105 Indeed, the whole question of how to delineate "public law litigation" may have seemed
simple in the mid-1970s, but it is open to considerable debate. See Richard L. Marcus, Public
Law Litigation and Legal Scholarship, 21 U. MicH. J.L. REFORM 647, 668-75 (1988) (discussing
the uneasy dividing line between "public" and "private" law litigation, and suggesting that mass
tort cases could be regarded as "public law litigation").
106 Philips Petrol. Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 809 (1985) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
107 Benjamin Kaplan, A Prefatory Note, 10 B.C. INDus. & COM. L. REV. 497, 500 (1969).
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cases.108 The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 put Congress's impri-
matur on case management as a way to reduce the duration and cost
of litigation.109 Promotion of settlement rose to prominence among
judicial tasks, and some suggested that many judges regarded it as
more important than their traditional adjudicatory functions.o10 As
Professor Molot has trenchantly written, however, taking on these
new judicial management responsibilities went well beyond the tradi-
tional strengths of judges, and perhaps also the constitutional notion
of judicial power."n
In managing class actions more specifically, there are at least
three specific tasks regarding which the importance and nature of ju-
dicial responsibility have lately been amplified: appointing class coun-
sel, awarding attorney's fees, and approving settlements.
Appointing class counsel. In 2003, Rule 23(g) was added, explic-
itly requiring that judges appoint class counsel as a part of class certifi-
cation.112 Previously, attention to the quality of counsel was a part of
the determination as to whether the adequate representation require-
ment of Rule 23(a)(4) was satisfied.113 But the previous treatment of
this appointment power had mainly involved the approval or (very
rarely) rejection of the lawyer who filed the case. On its face, the new
provision looks beyond that minimal inquiry and contemplates a judi-
cial comparison between competing applicants for the position. It is
derived from the long-recognized power of courts to appoint lead or
liaison counsel in consolidated cases or other multiparty situations.114
108 See FED. R. Civ. P. 16(b) (requiring a scheduling order in all civil cases except catego-
ries exempted by local rule).
109 Civil Justice Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089 (1990) (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-482 (2006)). The Senate Report that accompanied this legislation
invoked the "benefits of enhanced case management," which it took to mean "that greater and
earlier judicial control over civil cases yields faster rates of disposition." S. REP. No. 101-416, at
16 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6819.
110 See Edward Brunet, Questioning the Quality of Alternative Dispute Resolution, 62 TUL.
L. REV. 1, 50 (1987) (arguing that the judicial management movement "seems to have created an
attitude that a trial represents judicial failure").
111 See Molot, supra note 15, at 31-32.
112 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(g).
113 See, e.g., Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 508 F.2d 239, 247 (3d Cir. 1975) (holding that
Rule 23(a)(4) calls for the district judge to assess the proposed class representative by looking to
whether (1) plaintiff has no interests which are antagonistic to other members of the class, and
(2) plaintiff's attorney is capable of prosecuting the instant claim with some degree of expertise).
114 See, e.g., MacAlister v. Guterma, 263 F.2d 65, 68-69 (2d Cir. 1958) (upholding an order
appointing lead counsel in stockholders' consolidated derivative actions); MANUAL FOR COM-
PLEx LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 40.22 (2004) (providing a sample order enumerating the duties of
lead counsel).
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Ordinarily, of course, judges do not appoint counsel for parties in
civil cases; that is a choice left to the litigants. In class actions, how-
ever, judges themselves make the class members quasi-clients of class
counsel by certifying the class, and this appointment power accompa-
nies that decision. It is conceivable to allocate the power to others in
some cases. The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act
("PSLRA"),11s for example, sought to do so by directing the judge to
appoint as "lead plaintiff" in securities fraud class actions the class
member or group of class members with the largest losses, and then
left it to the lead plaintiff to choose the lawyer.116 As the Ninth Cir-
cuit held, "[s]o long as the plaintiff with the largest losses satisfies the
[Rule 23] typicality and adequacy requirements, he is entitled to lead
plaintiff status [under the PSLRA], even if the district court is con-
vinced that some other plaintiff would do a better job.""7 And that
means that the district judge may not second-guess the lead plaintiff's
choice of lawyer: "[s]electing a lawyer in whom a litigant has confi-
dence is an important client prerogative and we will not lightly infer
that Congress meant to take away this prerogative from securities
plaintiffs."118
Selecting a lawyer is an important client prerogative in a lot of
other types of litigation, but there seems little chance that many
others would support conferring that authority on a class member or
group of them.119 And presently there is no legal authority for the
judge to defer to others' choices in a similar manner. The task of
choosing between competing lawyers is a difficult one for judges, how-
ever. One creative judge decided to try auctioning off the position in
115 Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
116 15 U.S.C. § 17u-4(a)(3) (2006).
117 In re Cavanaugh, 306 F.3d 726, 732 (9th Cir. 2002).
118 Id. at 734.
119 See Jill E. Fisch, Lawyers on the Auction Block: Evaluating the Selection of Class Coun-
sel by Auction, 102 COLUM. L. REv. 650, 722 (2002). Professor Fisch concludes that the "empow-
ered plaintiff" model could be expanded to other situations in which certain criteria were
satisfied:
First, the class must include members with a sufficient financial stake in the litiga-
tion. Only if the empowered lead plaintiff has a sufficient interest in the case will it
incur the costs of identifying, negotiating with, and monitoring class counsel. Sec-
ond, the potential lead plaintiffs must be sufficiently representative of the interests
of other class members. . . . Third, the size of a class member's interest should be
correlated with its sophistication and ability to handle the selection, negotiation,
and monitoring processes.
Id.
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securities litigation before the PSLRA was adopted, 120 but the method
was not met with wide acceptance.121
The choice, therefore, ordinarily falls to (or on) the judge. "Few
decisions by the court in complex litigation are as difficult and sensi-
tive as the appointment of designated counsel."1 22 And the stakes are
unavoidably high: "[a]ppointment of class counsel is an extraordinary
practice with respect to dictating and limiting the class members' con-
trol over the attorney-client relationship and thus requires a height-
ened level of scrutiny to ensure that the interests of the class members
are adequately represented and protected."I 23 As Professor Molot
recognizes, this task requires a departure from the traditional role of
American judges: "[i]n the class action context, . . . the judge is largely
responsible for monitoring the attorney-client relationship."12 4
This task can require great effort and difficult evaluation of a
wide variety of matters. For example, in an ERISA class action, a
district judge was presented with applications from five sets of law
firms, all of which seemed to be very competent and experienced.125
Eventually the judge rejected one law firm, although its lawyers "have
impressive ERISA backgrounds and have been appointed by several
courts to be lead counsel in major ERISA litigation," in part because
of concern about a possible conflict with the firm's role as class coun-
sel in another ERISA class action involving an entity related to this
employer. 126 To reach this conclusion, the judge had to analyze a
merger agreement and evaluate the question whether the two corpo-
rate entities should be regarded as one for purposes of a possible con-
flict.12 7 This judgment is the sort that a court can do, but even on such
topics, judges may disagree. Thus, another judge subsequently ap-
pointed the same lawyers class counsel in another ERISA case, con-
cluding that the "appearance of divided loyalty" standard used by the
first judge was not a proper one. 128 But these sorts of judgments are at
least the kind of thing that judges are called upon to do in resolving
120 See, e.g., In re Oracle Sec. Litig., 131 F.R.D. 688, 689-90 (N.D. Cal. 1990); Laural L.
Hooper & Marie Leary, Auctioning the Role of Class Counsel, 209 F.R.D. 519 (2001).
121 See Report, Third Circuit Task Force Report on Selection of Class Counsel, 74 TEMP. L.
REv. 689, 740-41 (2001) (evaluating the auction method and finding that it would work only in
limited and very rare circumstances).
122 MANUAL FOR COMPLEx LIrGATION (FOURTH) § 10.224 (2004).
123 In re J.P. Morgan Chase Cash Balance Litig., 242 F.R.D. 265, 277 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
124 Molot, supra note 15, at 47-48 (emphasis added).
125 In re Cardinal Health, Inc. ERISA Litig., 225 F.R.D. 552, 554 (S.D. Ohio 2005).
126 Id. at 556.
127 See id. at 557 & n.6.
128 See Nowak v. Ford Motor Co., 240 F.R.D. 355, 366-67 (E.D. Mich. 2006) (rejecting the
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motions to disqualify and, in that sense, fall within the broad tradi-
tional role of courts in resolving disputed legal matters.
Awarding attorney's fees. During the last generation, judges have
increasingly had to set attorney's fees because applying for court-
awarded fees has become something of a cottage industry for the legal
profession. In class actions, the task may be necessary because the
suit is based on a statute that includes a fee-shifting provision, or be-
cause the common-benefit justification for paying the lawyer from the
proceeds of the suit applies.12 9 Either way, the judge ultimately will
have to determine how much the lawyers should be paid. In litigated
cases, that may be a fiercely contested point; losing defendants may
focus with particular vehemence on the fee award to plaintiffs' coun-
sel. In settled cases, defendant may have agreed not to oppose a fee
application up to a certain (generous) amount. As amended in 2003,
Rule 23(h) now recognizes and focuses this responsibility of the court.
It requires notice to the class of the amount the attorneys are seeking
and authorizes objections by class members to the fee award, as well
as the possibility of a fee award to the objectors' lawyers for success-
fully reducing the fee. 130
In theory, the judge is to approach this task like a private client.
In reality, as a district judge objected over twenty years ago, when the
fee-award question reaches the judge in a settled class action, "the
court is abandoned by the adversary system and left to the plaintiff's
unilateral application and the judge's own good conscience." 13 1 More-
over, like a private client, the judge may be overwhelmed by a huge
and detailed showing of the amount of time spent by swarms of law-
yers over years. At least clients usually get to absorb and evaluate this
conclusion that the firm not appointed in Cardinal Health, 225 F.R.D. 552, had a conflict). The
court explained:
The Cardinal Health opinion also cites DR 5-105 and EC 5-14 which prohibited
joint representation where there was an "appearance of divided loyalties of coun-
sel." Having taught a course on legal ethics for many years, it was my understand-
ing that decades ago when Ohio and nearly all states abandoned the ABA Code of
Professional Responsibility and its Disciplinary Rule and adopted versions of ABA
Model Rules of Professional Conduct, the new rules abandoned this "appearance
of divided loyalty" standard and drafted more precise conflict guidelines. For vari-
ous reasons, while recognizing the importance of the conflicts issues raised in Car-
dinal Health, that opinion does not demonstrate a sufficient factual basis to find
that [the law firm] was acting inappropriately.
Id.
129 For discussion of these two fee-calculation methods, see MANUAL FOR COMPLEx LITI-
GATION (FOURTH) §§ 14.1-.2 (2004).
130 See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(h).
131 In re Activision Sec. Litig., 723 F. Supp. 1373, 1374 (N.D. Cal. 1989).
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detailed backup on a monthly basis, but the judge gets the entire pile
at the end of the litigation. The Supreme Court has directed that, at
least in cases involving fee-shifting statutes, the customary measure
should involve the lodestar hourly-rate approach. 132 But this ap-
proach has been likened to "converting the courts into the equivalent
of public utility commissions that oversee the plaintiff's attorney,"13 3
and efforts by judges to set limits in advance have been derided as
trying "to determine the equivalent of the medieval just price." 134
The alternative is, at least in class actions, yielding a "fund" for
the class, to award the attorney a percentage of the fund. But when
the class settlement is for coupons or something of the like, valuing
this "fund" may prove quite problematic also. Even with class action
settlements not involving coupons, the challenges of using a percent-
age approach can be great; as another district judge asked twenty
years ago: "What is 30% of up to $70 million payable over a period of
years?" 35 Often, courts "cross-check" the results of the percentage
approach against the lodestar calculation, meaning that both difficult
analyses must be done. 13 6
Undertaking this difficult task is important. As a RAND study of
class actions concluded, proper review of attorney's fees can be crucial
to proper handling of class actions.13 7 But judges called upon to do
the job must move beyond their comfort zone in assessing the applica-
tion of legal rules to evidence produced in court. Moreover, even
their familiarity with the progress of the case before them may be of
limited value in assessing the true value of the lawyers' out-of-court
efforts.
Settlement approval. The original Rule 23 directed that class ac-
tions could not be dismissed without the approval of the court, 38 and
132 See, e.g., City of Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557, 562 (1992) (declaring that the lode-
star measure is "the guiding light of our fee-shifting jurisprudence").
133 John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiffs Attorney: The Implications of Eco-
nomic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 COLUM.
L. REV. 669, 725 (1986).
134 In re Cont'1 Ill. Sec. Litig., 962 F.2d 566, 568 (7th Cir. 1992).
135 In re Superior Beverage/Glass Container Consol. Pretrial, 133 F.R.D. 119, 124 (N.D. Ill.
1990).
136 See, e.g., id. at 128-33.
137 See DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET AL., RAND INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, CLASS ACTION
DILEMMAS: PURSUING PUBLIC GOALS FOR PRIVATE GAIN: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 24 (1999),
available at http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph-reports/2005/MR969.1.pdf (stating that "what
judges do [in class actions] is the key to determining the benefit-cost ratio," and that salutary
results followed when judges "took responsibility for determining attorney's fees").
138 See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c), 308 U.S. 689 (1939) (amended 1966).
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the 1966 rewrite retained this feature'13 But the "procedural manage-
ment"140 provided in the 1966 Rule was minimal beyond stating that
there should be notice to the class. In 2003, Rule 23(e) was exten-
sively rewritten, and it now provides many guidelines and directives
for courts reviewing proposed class action settlements.
The detail provided by amended Rule 23(e) does not alter the
reality that judges performing this task are doing a job quite different
from traditional adjudication. One factor judges may consider is
whether the class has a good or poor chance of success at trial; in
performing this task they would be doing something like what Judge
Tyler was doing in Eisen in forecasting the likely results of the litiga-
tion before him.141 But unlike Judge Tyler, judges evaluating settle-
ments would not likely have vigorous adversary presentations on
which to base their decisions; it may even be that class counsel (now in
sight of substantial fees) are emphasizing the weaknesses of their
case.14 2 And judges should be considering many other things besides
likelihood of success. Objectors may "assist" the court in evaluating
these matters, but objectors are themselves a dubious source of notice
that something is awry with a proposed settlement. They could them-
selves be up to mischief, and seeking a payoff. Indeed, the risk of a
sellout by objectors explains the requirement in Rule 23(e)(5) that
any class member who files an objection must obtain the court's per-
mission to withdraw it.
Even with a thorough ventilation of the issues, a judge reviewing
a proposed class action settlement is called upon to reach a conclusion
that goes well beyond conventional "legal" standards. There may be a
temptation toward what the Supreme Court has called "appraisals of
the chancellor's foot kind."I 43 How much weight should be attached
to immediate payment as opposed to the risk not only of a loss at trial,
but also of a long wait for resolution of the inevitable appeal following
a victory at trial? If the settlement involves a change in the defen-
dant's behavior in relation to complicated and disputed matters, how
readily can the judge assess the value of the changed behavior and
139 See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e).
140 See supra text accompanying note 40 (quoting Professor Kaplan's comment about the
absence of details on the "procedural management" of class actions in the original Rule 23).
141 See supra text accompanying notes 59-69.
142 See, e.g., Parker v. Anderson, 667 F.2d 1204, 1212 n.9 (5th Cir. 1982) (quoting a letter
from class counsel to lead plaintiffs emphasizing the risks of proceeding to trial).
143 Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 621 (1997) (explaining further that the
Court was referring to "class certifications dependent upon the court's gestalt judgment or over-
arching impression of the settlement's fairness").
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determine whether it should generally benefit class members or favor
some over others?'" These and other questions explain why scholars
have proposed a potpourri of palliatives to deal with the difficulty of
evaluating proposed settlements.145 Others have offered judges in-
struction on the multiple details they should have in mind in assessing
proposed settlements in specific areas on which these scholars are ex-
pert.14 6 Judges are generalists; although they are expert in the law,
they cannot be expected similarly to master every topic from con-
sumer cases to employment discrimination to antitrust. 1 47 Ultimately,
what they must do is become regulators, sensitive both to the dynam-
ics of litigation activity and the underlying concerns of the body of law
that give rise to the claims asserted.
IV. BACK TO BASICS-MERITS SCRUTINY DURING
CLASS CERTIFICATION
Compared with the sorts of tasks recounted in the prior Part,
making a judgment about the probable proof at trial and the persua-
siveness of that proof seems well within the ordinary business of judg-
ing. On motions for preliminary injunctions, courts regularly make
similar assessments early in litigation. 14 8 For decades, they have in-
sisted under Rule 16 on details about the manner of proof as a part of
the pretrial process. And evaluating various features of the class certi-
fication calculus-particularly whether there are common questions
and whether (in Rule 23(b)(3) class actions) those questions will
predominate at trial-calls for a similar assessment. As Professor
Geoffrey Miller has recently put it, "[p]reliminary judgments are not
alien to American litigation. On the contrary, they are ubiquitous." 49
144 See, e.g., In re Prudential Ins. Co. Sales Practices Litig., 148 F.3d 283 (3d Cir. 1998)
(undertaking extensive and painstaking evaluation of an elaborate settlement with a multitrack
claims procedure and changes in sales practices in order to determine whether it was a good deal
for class members).
145 See Molot, supra note 15, at 53-55 (reviewing various proposals).
146 See, e.g., Hillary A. Sale, Judicial Gatekeepers (working paper) (on file with author)
(offering many tips for judges on how to assess and probe proposed settlements in securities
fraud cases).
147 Professor Gibson compares the task of judges in bankruptcy proceedings with that con-
fronting judges evaluating class action settlements. She points out that, in the bankruptcy set-
ting, judges "have the advantage of having specific statutory standards for the confirmation of
the reorganization plan," something class action judges do not have. S. ELIZABETH GIBSON.
CASE STUDIES OF MASS TORT LIMITED FUND CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENTS & BANKRUPTCY
REORGANIZATIONs 5-6 (2000).
148 For an analysis of the judicial treatment of preliminary injunction motions, see generally
John Leubsdorf, The Standard for Preliminary Injunctions, 91 HARV. L. REV. 525 (1978).
149 Geoffrey P. Miller, Preliminary Judgments, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 165, 203.
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Under the impact of Eisen and due to the fear of one-way inter-
vention and the resulting risk of unfairness to defendants, however,
many courts shied away from confronting the merits in a serious way
during class certification. This judicial resistance to considering the
merits has excited much opposition over the years.150 And Eisen con-
tinues to be cited for the proposition that the strength of the plaintiff's
case on the merits cannot rightly be evaluated before class
certification. 51
But the worm has surely turned. The courts understand that Rule
12(b)(6) motions can be made before class certification is resolved.
Indeed, in class actions governed by the PSLRA, that is the first order
of business, and the court is not permitted to allow any discovery-
merits or otherwise-until after those motions are resolved.152 In
2001, the Seventh Circuit recognized that evidentiary inquiries are
necessary to determine whether a class should be certified.15 3 Shortly
thereafter, the Second Circuit upheld doing something a great deal
like a Daubert analysis of the expert theory propounded by the plain-
tiffs in support of class certification, but added that, if plaintiffs' expert
opinion survives Daubert scrutiny, it is "sufficiently reliable for class
certification purposes," and that challenges defendants launch at the
theory accordingly do not matter at the class certification stage.154 In
150 See, e.g., ABA Section of Litig., Report and Recommendations of the Special Committee
on Class Action Improvements, 110 F.R.D. 195, 206-09 (1986) (urging "precertification decision
of a merits motion"); Stephen Berry, Ending Substance's Indenture to Procedure: The Imperative
for Comprehensive Revision of the Class Damage Action, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 299, 312-14 (1980)
(citing a "pervasive sentiment favoring some sort of preliminary hearing on the merits"); Bartlett
H. McGuire, The Death Knell for Eisen: Why the Class Action Analysis Should Include an As-
sessment of the Merits, 168 F.R.D. 366, 368, 396-99 (1997) (stating that Eisen continues to be
cited as authoritative in forbidding assessment of the merits, but adding that this directive is also
"circumvented with increasing boldness by the lower courts," and urging adoption of a "substan-
tial probability of success" standard for assessing plaintiffs' cases).
151 See, e.g., Shook v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs, 543 F.3d 597, 612 (10th Cir. 2008) ("[A] dis-
trict court may not evaluate the strength of a cause of action at the class certification stage.").
152 See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(3)(B) (2006) (staying discovery while a motion to dismiss is
decided).
153 Szabo v. Bridgeport Machs., Inc., 249 F.3d 672, 676 (7th Cir. 2001) (observing that "if
some of the considerations under Rule 23(b)(3) . . . overlap the merits-as they do in this
case . . . -then the judge must make a preliminary inquiry into the merits").
154 In re Visa Check/Mastermoney Antitrust Litig., 280 F.3d 124, 135 (2d Cir. 2001)
(Sotomayor, J.). The court explained that, in ruling on class certification, the district judge
"must ensure that the basis of the expert opinion is not so flawed that it would be inadmissible as
a matter of law." Id. In this case, despite defendants' manifold objections to the testimony of
plaintiffs' expert, "the district court's finding that [the expert's] methodology was not fatally
flawed, and therefore[ ] was sufficiently reliable for class certification purposes, does not consti-
tute an abuse of its discretion." Id.
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2006, however, it repented that view and held that Eisen did not pre-
clude analysis of the merits as needed to decide class certification. In-
stead, the district judge must make "findings" on a mixed issue of law
and fact-whether the evidence likely to be presented at trial will sat-
isfy the class certification standards of Rule 23.xs5 Even some Justices
of the Supreme Court seem to regard consideration of the merits of
the suit as important to due process protections for defendants in rela-
tion to allocating cost of notice in a class action.156
What is likely to be the leading case, however, is the 2008 deci-
sion of the Third Circuit in In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litiga-
tion,157 authored by Chief Judge Scirica. Plaintiffs there filed a class
action, riding the coattails of governmental investigations about anti-
trust violations in the hydrogen peroxide industry.158 Hydrogen per-
oxide is sold in concentrations of 35%, 50%, and 70%, with the lower-
concentration product usually sold for a lower price than the higher-
concentration product. Overall, there are four different grades of hy-
drogen peroxide products. Plaintiffs nonetheless asserted that hydro-
gen peroxide products of the various grades were fungible, and made
claims on behalf of a class including purchasers of any grade against
The Seventh Circuit has recently held that failure to perform a full Daubert analysis of
plaintiffs' expert theory before certifying a class is error:
We hold that when an expert's report or testimony is critical to class certification, as
it is here, a district court must conclusively rule on any challenge to the expert's
qualifications or submissions prior to ruling on a class certification motion. That is,
the district court must perform a full Daubert analysis before certifying the class if
the situation warrants.
Am. Honda Motor Co. v. Allen, 600 F.3d 813, 815-16 (7th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted).
155 In re Initial Pub. Offerings Sec. Litig. (IPO), 471 F.3d 24, 40-41 (2d Cir. 2006). This
opinion represents a remarkable confession of error by Judge Newman, the author of Caridad v.
Metro-North Commuter Railroad, 191 F.3d 283 (2d Cir. 1999), the leading Second Circuit case
for the proposition that merits scrutiny is not permitted, and then-Judge Sotomayor, who had so
declared in 2001 in reliance on Judge Newman's earlier decision in Caridad, see Visa Check, 280
F.3d at 135. The court carefully chronicled the emergence of the view that scrutiny of the merits
is permissible. See IPO, 471 F.3d at 32-42.
156 See DTD Enterprises, Inc. v. Wells, 130 S. Ct. 7, 7-8 (2009), in which the Court denied
certiorari in a case in which defendant claimed that the state court below required it to pay the
cost of notice in a class action because plaintiff could not afford to pay. Justice Kennedy, joined
by the Chief Justice and Justice Sotomayor, dissented from the denial of certiorari: "To the ex-
tent that New Jersey law allows a trial court to impose the onerous costs of class notification on a
defendant simply because of the relative wealth of the defendant and without any consideration
of the underlying merits of the suit, a serious due process question is raised." See id. at 8 (Ken-
nedy, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
157 In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305 (3d Cir. 2008).
158 See id. at 308 (describing investigations by the United States Department of Justice and
the European Commission of possible antitrust violations in the hydrogen peroxide industry).
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defendant producers, some of whom produce only one or two of the
four grades.159
The class certification dispute began with an assumption that
there would be evidence supporting a finding that there had been a
conspiracy to fix prices, and boiled down to predominance-whether
the question of "antitrust impact" could be proved by common evi-
dence or depended on an individual showing by each purchaser that it
paid inflated prices. 16 0 An implicit assumption was that the common
questions raised by proof of conspiracy did not themselves suffice to
establish predominance under Rule 23(b)(3).161
Antitrust impact has long been a major obstacle to class certifica-
tion of Rule 23(b)(3) classes in price-fixing cases, and impact argu-
ments often implicitly overlap with the merits of the case. As in
Hydrogen Peroxide, defendants may challenge the conclusion that
their products are interchangeable. 162 At some level, this challenge
seems to strike at the notion that there could be a conspiracy to fix
prices. If the products are not interchangeable, how could (indeed,
why would) producers conspire to raise prices together? Thus, pre-
dominance problems may arise in relation to both the question of im-
pact and the question of proving price fixing.16 3
A conventional solution to these problems is to invoke expert tes-
timony, and plaintiffs in Hydrogen Peroxide offered the testimony of
an economics Ph.D. who asserted that common proof could be used to
establish impact, assuming there was a conspiracy. He claimed that
159 Id. at 307-08.
160 See id. at 310-12 (reporting that defendants did not contest the district judge's conclu-
sion that the requisites of Rule 23(a) were satisfied).
161 In a sense, the impact question resembles the question of reliance in securities fraud
cases, where the common liability question whether defendants were guilty of inadequate or
misleading statements is not regarded as sufficient to outweigh the question of reliance if that
must be examined on an individual basis. The solution in securities fraud class actions has been
the "fraud on the market" theory. See Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 246-47 (1988)
(adopting fraud-on-the-market theory); Donald C. Langevoort, Basic at Twenty: Rethinking
Fraud on the Market, 2009 Wis. L. REv. 151, 179 (asserting that "Basic was a boon to plaintiffs,
leading to a rapid increase in the number of fraud-on-the-market suits after 1988-the number
of filings had tripled by 1991, and continued to rise dramatically over the next fifteen years").
162 See Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 313.
163 See, e.g., Alabama v. Blue Bird Body Co., 573 F.2d 309, 321-28 (5th Cir. 1978) (rejecting
class certification of a nationwide class in relation to an alleged conspiracy to fix the price of
school buses, which were made to suit the specifications of the purchasing school district); In re
Screws Antitrust Litig., 91 F.R.D. 52, 57-58 (D. Mass. 1981) (certifying a class despite the "prod-
uct diversity" of wood screws shown by defendants, on the notion that "[s]crews are not inher-
ently diverse, and distinctions offered are likely to be 'surface distinctions' which should not
deter class certification").
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the various grades of hydrogen peroxide are fungible, and reasoned
that because production is heavily concentrated in a small group of
producers with high barriers to entry and no close substitute products,
and defendants' geographic markets overlapped, there would have
been lower prices absent conspiracy. 64 According to plaintiffs' ex-
pert, prices moved in tandem over time, and various producers raised
list prices at the same time.165 He also identified two "potential ap-
proaches" to estimating damages suffered by the class.166 Defendants
countered with the opinion of their own Ph.D. economist, whose
views were "irreconcilable" with those of plaintiffs' expert.167 He de-
nied that the products were fungible on the ground that the various
grades of hydrogen peroxide have differing supply characteristics and
demand conditions.s68 He also asserted that the prices actually
charged individual customers did not move together, pointing out that
contracts for the sale of hydrogen peroxide were often individually
negotiated. Some customers experienced reductions in price at a time
when others were paying more.169
Defendants moved to exclude the opinion of plaintiffs' expert
under Daubert, but the district court denied the motion to exclude and
defendants did not challenge that decision on appeal.17 0 The district
judge also stated that he should not "'weigh the relative credibility"'
of the competing expert views, and that it was sufficient that plaintiffs
had made a threshold showing.171 The Court of Appeals held this
scrutiny inadequate, and announced two basic principles to guide the
certification process that can be articulated as follows:
(1) The requirements of Rule 23 are not mere pleading rules; in-
quiry beyond the pleadings is required. 172 If that inquiry "overlaps"
with merits issues, it must nonetheless be done; Eisen "is best under-
stood to preclude only a merits inquiry that is not necessary to deter-
mine a Rule 23 requirement." 1 73 The need for backup and discovery is
manifest; in fact, plaintiffs in Hydrogen Peroxide had access to consid-
164 See Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 312-13.
165 Id. at 313.
166 Id.
167 Id. at 314.
168 Id. at 313.
169 Id. at 314.
170 Id. at 314-15 & n.13.
171 Id. at 322 (quoting In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 240 F.R.D. 163, 171 (E.D.
Pa. 2007)).
172 Id. at 316.
173 Id. at 317.
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erable information. 74 This approach was implicit in the 2003 amend-
ments to Rule 23(c), which revised the timing directive from "as soon
as practicable" to "an early practicable time" and removed the prior
authorization for "conditional" certification. 75
(2) The district court must make findings that each Rule 23 re-
quirement is satisfied to support granting class certification: "Factual
determinations necessary to make Rule 23 findings must be made by a
preponderance of the evidence. In other words, to certify a class, the
district court must find that the evidence more likely than not estab-
lishes each fact necessary to meet the requirements of Rule 23."176
The "threshold showing" attitude of the district court was there-
fore insufficiently demanding. The district judge had to confront the
substantive points made by defendant's expert, not just conclude that
the opinions of plaintiffs' expert survived a Daubert analysis.'77 Al-
though a conspiracy to maintain prices could impact the entire class
even though some customers benefitted from lower prices for part of
the class period, the district court could reach that conclusion only
"after considering all relevant evidence."17 8
V. IMPLICATIONS
Moving the class certification decision back to judging basics
seems to emphasize the sorts of tasks judges do best, but it may have a
number of other consequences. Whether Hydrogen Peroxide causes
major changes in class action practice depends in large part on
whether one believes the courts were regularly refraining from scruti-
nizing the merits until recently.1 79 Because the "Eisen rule" has "be-
174 See id. at 308 n.3 ("Defendants assert, and plaintiffs do not dispute, that they provided
to plaintiffs all available sales transactions and other market data relevant to how hydrogen
peroxide and persalts were bought and sold during the class period.").
175 See id. at 318-19. At the time these amendments were adopted, Chief Judge Scirica was
chair of the Judicial Conference's Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure.
176 Id. at 320.
177 Id. at 322-24.
178 Id. at 325.
179 Consider Professor Silver's 2003 description:
[A 1996 Federal Judicial Center study] conveys a picture of the law in action that
diverges markedly from the law on the books. Formally, judges are supposed to
decide certification motions "[a]s soon as practicable" after the start of litigation
without peeking at the merits. In fact, judges usually decide dispositive motions
before certification. They refuse to certify until they are persuaded that plaintiffs
allegations have merit. Precertification rulings are common even in the Northern
District of Illinois, which operates under case law disapproving the practice.
Silver, supra note 8, at 1395.
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come a pillar of class action practice,"1 80 and until recently most courts
resisted even applying Daubert to expert opinions proffered in sup-
port of certification, 181 some significant effect is likely. One court has
labeled Hydrogen Peroxide a "watershed decision." 182 As noted
above,183 there is no question that at least some observers see a signifi-
cant shift, and dislike what they see. For others-particularly those
who pine for vigorous screening for probability of success as a prereq-
uisite to certification' 84-it is probably an attractive trend but not suf-
ficiently aggressive. It is therefore useful to reflect on at least some of
the plausible implications.
A. More Work for Lawyers and Judges
In Eisen, Judge Tyler hoped that his decision on remand could be
made after "minimum" discovery and a "brief" hearing.185 Class certi-
fication decisions that could be speedily made on the basis of the com-
plaint surely involved less effort for judges and lawyers, but that is
obviously not a strong argument in favor of handling certification that
way. Nonetheless, choreographing the certification decision becomes
more challenging the more preparation it requires. As a judge manag-
ing a huge consolidated case put it, "[o]ne of the issues at stake is
always which should come first, dispositive motions or class certifica-
tion."186 Managing workload is an important feature of judicial man-
agement, and opening the door to more consideration of the merits
before class certification will magnify that workload.
Whatever the original merit of trying to divide discovery between
"merits" and "certification" issues, that effort will frequently fail in
the future. But that does not mean that there can be no funneling of
discovery to the issues that must be addressed first. To the contrary,
180 Geoffrey P. Miller, Review of the Merits in Class Action Certification, 33 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 51, 51 (2004).
181 See L. Elizabeth Chamblee, Comment, Between "Merit Inquiry" and "Rigorous Analy-
sis": Using Daubert to Navigate the Gray Areas of Federal Class Action Certification, 31 FLA. ST.
U. L. REV. 1041, 1068-74 (2004) (reporting that courts were unwilling to use Daubert during
class certification, mainly to avoid addressing the substantive merits).
182 McDonough v. Toys "R" Us, Inc., 638 F. Supp. 2d 461, 467 (E.D. Pa. 2009).
183 See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
184 E.g., Robert G. Bone & David S. Evans, Class Certification and the Substantive Merits,
51 DuKE L.J. 1251, 1331 (2002) (urging courts to evaluate the merits of plaintiffs' case before
certifying in order to ensure that the settlement-inducing power of certification is not available
unless it appears that plaintiffs will win); Hazard, supra note 83, at 3-4.
185 See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 52 F.R.D. 253, 272 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
186 In re New Motor Vehicles Canadian Exp. Antitrust Litig., 229 F.R.D. 35, 40 (D. Me.
2005) (refusing to entertain a summary judgment motion because the litigation schedule called
for addressing class certification first).
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appellate courts that insist that district judges carefully scrutinize the
merits and make Rule 23 findings also emphasize that the district
judges have substantial discretion in deciding how much discovery is
needed to support that scrutiny.1 87
Giving judges broad discretion to control discovery does not
make that task easy, however. From plaintiffs' (and perhaps defend-
ants') perspective, it may be that something approaching full discov-
ery is essential. Particularly when they intend to rely on expert
opinions to support class certification and to prove their cases at trial,
anything less may be too risky. Although the expert opinion rendered
at the class certification stage is not the "final" opinion required
before trial,188 it is an important opinion about the specific issues
raised in the case. Any time that an expert offers such an opinion-
even with caveats about the possibility that further study could lead to
a different opinion-there is a risk of impeachment at trial due to
changes in the opinion unless the expert has already had access to all
information that might bear on the opinion. As a consequence, some-
thing approaching full discovery may often seem essential to proper
preparation of experts' opinions on class certification. Beyond that,
because plaintiffs are called upon to make an evidentiary showing on
issues also central to the merits-albeit on the slightly different ques-
tion of predominance-they may have a legitimate need for access to
full discovery regarding those "liability" issues. Courts are therefore
frequently going to have to determine how much discovery to order
before class certification is decided. 189
187 See, e.g., In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 310 (3d Cir. 2008)
("The trial court, well-positioned to decide which facts and legal arguments are most important
to each Rule 23 requirement, possesses broad discretion to control proceedings and frame issues
for consideration under Rule 23."); IPO, 471 F.3d 24, 41 (2d Cir. 2006) ("To avoid the risk that a
Rule 23 hearing will extend into a protracted mini-trial of substantial portions of the underlying
litigation, a district judge must be accorded considerable discretion to limit both discovery and
the extent of the hearing on Rule 23 requirements.").
188 See, for example, Oplchenski v. Parfurns Givenchy, Inc., 254 F.R.D. 489, 497 n.6 (N.D.
Ill. 2008), in which the court rejected plaintiffs' argument that the reports from defendants' ex-
pert should be stricken in relation to the class certification decision because the reports were not
disclosed in advance. The court held that Rule 26(a)(2)(B) (regarding disclosure of expert re-
ports) did not apply because "[t]he opinions of the experts pertain to issues to be addressed
regarding class certification, not the merits of the underlying claims." Id.
189 See, for example, In re Rail Freight Fuel Surcharge Antitrust Litigation, 258 F.R.D. 167,
176 (D.D.C. 2009), in which the court denied defendants' motion for bifurcated discovery, with
the first phase limited to "class" discovery. The judge explained:
[Diefendants have to concede that they are asking plaintiffs (and therefore the
Court) to accept their formulation of the certification question and their determi-
nation of what pertains to it. But, the whole purpose of discovery is to find not
only those documents that defendants wish for plaintiffs to see but all documents
[Vol. 79:324356
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Although the Supreme Court has recently expressed misgivings
about the ability of district judges to control discovery, 90 this task
seems manageable. Indeed, in the past, it was the defendants who
were often more aggressive than plaintiffs during precertification dis-
covery, pursuing questions about the willingness and ability of class
representatives to finance suits and scaring some of them off.'9'
Courts soon squelched those efforts, but more creative ones may ap-
pear. In general, defendants can do discovery about the topics rele-
vant to class certification.192 But courts will sometimes have to be
careful about whether the discovery defendants seek actually holds
promise of shedding light on whether the case should be certified. For
example, in one case, defendant sought to capitalize on a falling out
among the lawyers in the firm representing plaintiffs and served sub-
poenas on that firm and a former partner of the firm to evaluate
whether the firm had the necessary resources to support class action
litigation.193 That is, of course, a relevant consideration in appoint-
ment of class counsel. 194 And in this instance, evidently, one defecting
lawyer had made statements suggesting that his former firm lacked
sufficient resources to prosecute class actions, and also made other
accusations of wrongdoing that had received public attention and
might have interfered with the firm's ability to represent the class.195
that pertain to the certification issue that plaintiffs believe will advance their posi-
tion. To limit plaintiffs to what defendants will give them is to, in effect, begin and
end discovery with defendants' voluntary disclosures. But, unlike continental sys-
tems where discovery consists of what the parties voluntarily exchange, the Ameri-
can system expressly authorizes each party to independently demand relevant
evidence from its opponent. While bifurcated discovery may have much to recom-
mend it, defendants' assertions about the ease with which they can find responsive
documents only apply if I limit plaintiffs to what defendants will give them. That
approach in effect amends the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to create a unique
form of discovery for class actions.
Id. at 173. See also Kingsberry v. Chi. Title Ins. Co., 258 F.R.D. 668, 670-71 (W.D. Wash. 2009)
(permitting discovery that would likely produce substantiation of consumers' class allegations).
190 See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 559 (2007) (referring to "the common
lament that the success of judicial supervision in checking discovery abuse has been on the mod-
est side"). Compare the views of Justice Breyer, dissenting in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 126 S. Ct. 1937,
1961-62 (2009) (Breyer, J., dissenting), and affirming the utility of judicial supervision in con-
taining overdiscovery. It is perhaps worth noting that Justice Breyer's brother is a district judge.
191 See, e.g., Betty C. Bullock, Note, Discovery of Plaintiffs' Financial Situation in Federal
Class Actions: Heading 'Ern Off at the Passbook, 30 HASTINGs L.J. 449, 450 (1978).
192 See, e.g., Eggleston v. Chi. Journeymen Plumbers' Local Union No. 130, 657 F.2d 890,
904 (7th Cir. 1981).
193 Stock v. Integrated Health Plan, Inc., 241 F.R.D. 618, 620-21 (S.D. Ill. 2007).
194 See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(g)(1) (directing the court to consider counsel's expertise and
resources in evaluating counsel's adequacy).
195 Stock, 241 F.R.D. at 621 & n.1.
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The judge quashed the subpoenas, ruling that the information sought
would not assist in making the class certification decision. 196
Defendants may also steal a march on plaintiffs and move for
determination of the class certification issue before plaintiffs do. As
the Ninth Circuit has recognized recently, "[n]othing in the plain lan-
guage of Rule 23(c)(1)(A) either vests plaintiffs with the exclusive
right to put the class certification issue before the district court or pro-
hibits a defendant from seeking early resolution of the class certifica-
tion question."' 97  But just as district judges must superintend
discovery to keep it within bounds for certification, they must also
take care that defendants do not so accelerate the decision that plain-
tiffs cannot adequately prepare. Indeed, to the extent defendants ob-
ject to questionable grants of certification as supporting "blackmail"
with weak claims because certification is of such momentous impor-
tance, it seems more than odd for them simultaneously to contend
that the decision on class certification must be accelerated to avert the
possibility that the class will be certified if a fuller factual inquiry
occurs.
It must be true that these shifts sometimes increase the cost plain-
tiffs' counsel must bear to prosecute class actions. Even the prospect
of relatively untrammeled discovery about "merits" issues before cer-
tification (something that plaintiffs' counsel in general would probably
applaud) also means that there will be additional discovery costs, and
additional material to be sifted. And then plaintiffs' counsel will bear
the burden of proving certification is justified by persuading the dis-
trict judge by a preponderance of the evidence that the Rule 23 re-
quirements are satisfied. Although many plaintiffs' counsel have
substantial resources to support such litigation, those resources are
not unlimited, and under the impact of the current economic difficul-
ties, these lawyers may be more cautious than usual about committing
their resources to such a demanding process.198 But at least plaintiffs'
counsel can look forward to enhanced value for their cases once the
196 Id. at 625.
197 Vinole v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 571 F.3d 935, 939-40 (9th Cir. 2009). The
court noted further that "district courts throughout the nation have considered defendants' 'pre-
emptive' motions to deny certification." Id. at 940.
198 For example, a recent article quoted Diane Sullivan, a defense-side lawyer at the Phila-
delphia firm Dechert LLP, as saying that mass tort filings are down, and added: "Sullivan also
asserts that plaintiffs attorneys 'have been more willing to settle at lower dollar amounts,' al-
though she declined to cite specific examples because of confidentiality agreements. 'They're
choosing cash now over investing in prolonged litigation,' she says." Claire Zillman, Develop-
ments: Cash-Flow Woes, LITIG. 2009, Fall 2009, at 13. Plaintiff-side lawyers reportedly disputed
these sorts of assertions. Id.
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class action is certified; this seal of judicial approval should provide
considerably more settlement clout than the prior model.199
Ultimately, however, the one most stressed by these develop-
ments may be the judge. Passing on class certification issues was chal-
lenging already, even though only a prima facie showing had to be
made. Having to perform a Daubert analysis of the plaintiffs' expert
opinions was an added challenge. Having to move beyond that and
make "findings" including evaluating the relative persuasiveness of
the plaintiffs' and defendants' experts is more challenging still, as is
the prospect that such evaluations will be supported by considerably
more discovery and, accordingly, expanded submissions to the court.
Altogether this effort is likely to take up more time and energy
from all participants. At the same time, however, it should yield bet-
ter decisions in a significant number of cases.
B. Fewer Classes Certified
The "better" certification decisions could go either way; plaintiffs
who have broader discovery opportunities may develop support for
certification that they would not have been able to provide under
prior regimes. Put differently, there will probably be fewer false posi-
tives and fewer false negatives. 2 00 But it is probably also true that
plaintiffs will find it harder to satisfy the current approach than it was
to obtain certification under prior, more truncated versions.201
Certainly there are limits to the current approach's demanding
attitude toward plaintiffs' showing, as illustrated by a recent Ninth
199 Professor Cox noted the same sort of thing in relation to the effect of the PSLRA on
securities class actions because it enhanced the scrutiny that occurred on a motion to dismiss:
Though lax pleading requirements made the nuisance value of a suit much more
difficult to address through pretrial motions, it must also be understood that the
Reform Act's heightened pleading standard credentials suits that survive pretrial
motions so that [they] will have greater settlement value than such suits had on
average before the Reform Act. . . . [Clounsel should feel more confident in the
case after satisfying the new pleading requirements than the counsel who previ-
ously had to know less and plead less to withstand a challenge to the pleadings.
James D. Cox, Making Securities Fraud Class Actions Virtuous, 39 ARIz. L. REV. 497, 520 (1997).
200 See Davis & Cramer, supra note 14, at 13 (using the terms "false negatives" and "false
positives" to describe the Hydrogen Peroxide approach).
201 Consider the following reactions from a leading plaintiff lawyer:
What had once been considered to be procedural motions are turning into a very
early litigation of the merits of the claims. That's kind of a mixed bag. If the plain-
tiffs prevail on these issues on a less-developed record fairly early in the case, it
puts defendants in a much more difficult position than they would be other-
wise .... A decision like Hydrogen Peroxide can carry some mixed blessings.
Antitrust Update, CAL. LAw., Sept. 2009, at 45 (quoting Joseph R. Saveri, Esq.).
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Circuit decision. Plaintiffs there filed a class action claiming that de-
fendant employer had violated California requirements for a thirty-
minute lunch break on the ground that people in a specified job status
were "on duty" during lunch and therefore not "totally relieved of all
duties" as required by the California statutes. 202 The district court had
held that certification should be denied because it could not be as-
sured that plaintiffs would prevail on their "on duty" theory, which
defendants contested. 203 Citing Eisen, the appellate court held that
the district judge went too far:
Here, the district court not only "judge[d] the validity" of
plaintiffs' "on duty" claims, it did so using a nearly insur-
mountable standard, concluding that merely because it was
not assured that plaintiffs would prevail on their primary le-
gal theory, that theory was not the appropriate basis for the
predominance inquiry. But a court can never be assured that
a plaintiff will prevail on a given legal theory prior to a dis-
positive ruling on the merits, and a full inquiry into the mer-
its of a putative class's legal claims is precisely what both the
Supreme Court and we have cautioned is not appropriate for
a Rule 23 certification inquiry.204
It may be that this Ninth Circuit decision shows that this appel-
late court is resisting the new approach,205 but the district court's ag-
gressive insistence upon being "assured" that plaintiffs' theory would
prevail at trial appears to be considerably more demanding than what
Hydrogen Peroxide is calling for. The fact that judges are looking for
more, however, almost certainly will mean that they will find plain-
tiffs' showings wanting more frequently than they did under more for-
giving regimes. And that corresponds to such evidence as there is
about the rate of certification. In the federal courts, the limited infor-
mation that is available indicates that the rate of class certification is
falling.206 Whether that decline results in any significant measure from
202 United Steel Workers Int'l Union v. ConocoPhillips Co., 593 F.3d 802, 804 (9th Cir.
2010).
203 Id. at 805.
204 Id. at 809.
205 In Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 571 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. granted, 79
U.S.L.W. 3128 (U.S. Dec. 6, 2010) (No. 10-277), the court, by a 6-5 en banc decision, affirmed
class certification in a mammoth employment discrimination case, id. at 628, but affirmed in Part
II of its opinion that it embraces demanding scrutiny of class certification, id. at 581.
206 See Thomas E. Willging & Shannon R. Wheatman, Attorney Choice of Forum in Class
Action Litigation: What Difference Does It Make?, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 591, 606 (2006)
(reporting approximately a one-third decline in frequency of certification of class actions termi-
nated in 1999-2002 compared with the rate in an earlier study focusing on federal-court class
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the increasing scrutiny of "merits" issues in relation to certification is
difficult to determine. A contrast is provided by a recent study of
certification in California state-court class actions during the period
2000-2005, which showed a substantial decline in the frequency of
certification.207
Concluding that the Hydrogen Peroxide approach to class certifi-
cation will reduce the frequency of certification tells us little about
whether that effect is a good thing. Obviously it is unattractive to
plaintiffs and pleasing to defendants, but discussion of the basic sub-
ject seems frozen in the impasse that Professor Landers observed
more than thirty-five years ago:
Proponents of [Rule 23] suggest that it is virtually the sole
bulwark against "legalized theft" by large institutions from
consumers, and that it is one of the most remarkable instru-
ments of social and economic justice to have been devised by
the ingenuity of man. Opponents of the rule speak of it as
"legalized blackmail," as a device for the most flagrant type
of claims solicitation by lawyers, and as a potential "engine
of destruction" of prominent and stable businesses. 2 0 8
Although it is inviting to conclude that those cases that fail to achieve
certification under Hydrogen Peroxide would more likely have led to
"legalized blackmail" than ferret out "legalized theft," there seems no
way to prove that point.
Those who stress the "legalized blackmail" concern, however,
would not likely be entirely satisfied with Hydrogen Peroxide's win-
nowing effect. Professors Bone and Evans, for example, have offered
an "ambitious proposal" that plaintiffs be required to prove a likeli-
hood of success in order to obtain class certification, in effect intro-
ducing some scrutiny like that used by Judge Tyler in Eisen as a
routine feature of the certification process. 2 09 Their premise was that
otherwise the settlement-coercing power of class certification will
actions terminated in 1992-1994); see also Thomas E. Willging & Emery G. Lee III, From Class
Actions to Multidistrict Consolidations: Aggregate Mass-Tort Litigation After Ortiz, 58 U. KAN. L.
REV. 775, 789-90 (2010) (discussing the declining frequency of class certification motions).
207 ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE COURTS, CLASS CERTIFICATION IN CALIFORNIA: SECOND IN-
TERIM REPORT FROM THE STUoY OF CALIFORNIA CLASS ACTION LITIGATION 6 (2010) (report-
ing that the percentage of cases in which the class was certified decreased by more than fifty
percent from 2000 to 2005). The report observes that the decreasing certification trend corre-
sponds to what has been experienced in the federal system, and suggests that one possible expla-
nation is that "evolving California and federal case law has narrowed the standards for a class
certification." Id. at 10-11.
208 Landers, supra note 59, at 843 (citations omitted).
209 See Bone & Evans, supra note 184, at 1278-80.
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come into play too often.210 As Professor Silver has argued, on the
other hand, there seems a limited basis for concluding that defendants
are often so coerced. 211 It may be important to keep in mind the
words of then-Judge Sotomayor: "The effect of certification on par-
ties' leverage in settlement negotiations is a fact of life for class action
litigants. While the sheer size of the class in this case may enhance
this effect, this alone cannot defeat an otherwise proper
certification."212
Perhaps consumer class actions present the most telling illustra-
tion of the blackmail concern. 2 1 3 An early example was Ratner v.
Chemical Bank New York Trust Co.,214 a proposed class action under
the Truth in Lending Act on behalf of 130,000 Master Charge card-
holders for failing to provide proper disclosure of the annual percent-
age rate of interest.215 Given the statutory minimum award of $100
per "victim," this suit could have led to an award of at least $13 mil-
lion for what seemed at most a small error of language. Judge Frankel
concluded that this "annihilating punishment" should not be visited
on defendant for such a small infraction, and found that allowing a
class action would infringe defendant's substantive rights. 21 6 Much as
this attitude may correspond with notions of inefficient overenforce-
ment,217 it is difficult to square with what Rule 23 says a gatekeeping
judge should have in mind in determining whether to certify a class.
Congress later solved the problem by adopting limits on recoveries in
Truth in Lending Act class actions,218 but the issue is much broader. 219
210 See id. at 1292-96.
211 See Silver, supra note 8, at 1399-408.
212 In re Visa Check/Mastermoney Antitrust Litig., 280 F.3d 124, 145 (2d Cir. 2001).
213 See also supra text accompanying notes 85-96 (discussing Katz v. Carte Blanche, 496
F.2d 747 (3d Cir. 1974)).
214 Ratner v. Chem. Bank N.Y. Trust Co., 54 F.R.D. 412 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
215 Id. at 413-14.
216 Id. at 416.
217 See, e.g., Kenneth W. Dam, Class Actions: Efficiency, Compensation, Deterrence, and
Conflict of Interest, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 47, 61 (1975) (arguing that class actions may invite enforc-
ers of certain rules to pursue remedies to the point of "inefficient overenforcement").
218 See Act of Oct. 28, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-495, § 408(a), 88 Stat. 1500, 1518 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (2006)) (setting a ceiling of $100,000 or 1% of the creditor's net
worth for awards in class actions). In 1976, the maximum amount was increased to $500,000. See
Consumer Leasing Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-240, § 4(3), 90 Stat. 257, 260 (codified at 15
U.S.C. § 16 40 (a)). For discussion, see 7B CHARLEs ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER &
MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1804 (3d ed. 2005).
219 See, e.g., Leysoto v. Mama Mia I., Inc., 255 F.R.D. 693, 698 (S.D. Fla. 2009) (refusing to
certify a class in a suit for alleged infractions of the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act
due to the failure to guard against disclosure of the customer's entire credit card number in light
of the "potentially annihilating" consequences of liability for the statutory minimum remedy).
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Arguably, the solution would be for legislatures enacting such con-
sumer protection measures routinely to insert provisions concerning
how class actions should be handled, like the one later adopted for the
Truth in Lending Act.220 At least here, there may be a cogent argu-
ment that screening of some sort focused on the promise of the suit on
the merits is in order.
This was, interestingly, the goal Judge Weinstein had in mind
shortly after the 1966 amendments to Rule 23 went into effect.
Presented with a proposed securities fraud class action in which he
faced cross-motions regarding class certification, he worried that the
notice attending class certification would itself harm defendants
whether or not the action was well founded. 2 2 1 Accordingly, he did
what the proponents of merits screening encourage:
A case such as the present one should not be allowed to pro-
ceed as a class action unless the plaintiffs are able to con-
vince the Court that there is a substantial possibility that
they will prevail on the merits. Something more than the
certification of good ground by an attorney is required. . . .
In this case, an evidentiary hearing at which the plaintiffs will
be required to make such a preliminary showing should be
held before the class action motion is decided. 2 22
Plaintiffs were therefore allowed considerable discovery,223 and
Judge Weinstein held a three-day evidentiary hearing. 224 At the end
of this hearing, Judge Weinstein invited defendants to move for sum-
220 For a case raising the issue whether a federal court should enforce such a limitation
when presented with a request under Rule 23 to certify a class in a suit based on a state law, see
Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431 (2010). For discus-
sion, see Linda S. Mullenix, Federal Class Actions: A Near-Death Experience in a Shady Grove,
79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 448 (2011).
221 See Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 501 (E.D.N.Y. 1968). As the court noted:
[T]he notice provisions themselves may prove harmful to defendants since the at-
tendant publicity and its official source may inflate the apparent importance of the
action. So much of the stock market depends upon faith and reputation that the
Court should be reluctant to lend its weight to any unnecessary publicity in connec-
tion with a pending lawsuit.
Id. (citation omitted).
222 Id.
223 As Judge Moore outlined in dissent from the eventual reversal in Dolgow v. Anderson,
438 F.2d 825 (2d Cir. 1971): "[Pllaintiffs had availed themselves of discovery procedures includ-
ing some twelve sets of interrogatories and had obtained from defendants over 7,600 pages of
documents. In addition, they had taken the depositions of the President and a Vice-President of
Monsanto [the company whose stock was involved] (some 1,500 pages)." Id. at 830-31 (Moore,
J., dissenting).
224 As detailed by Judge Moore later, in his dissent from the Second Circuit's reversal:
"Evidentiary hearings were held on December 18, 19, and 20, 1968. All materials previously
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mary judgment, and, after further argument, he granted that motion
and denied class certification. He was felled on appeal, however, on
the ground that he should not have granted summary judgment, seem-
ingly due to invocation of the Second Circuit's old "slightest doubt"
standard for summary judgment. 225 Meanwhile, Judge Tyler had emu-
lated Judge Weinstein in addressing the question of notice costs, lead-
ing to the Supreme Court's Eisen decision. Hydrogen Peroxide does
not invite embrace of Judge Weinstein's technique.
C "Findings" and the Seventh Amendment
The "findings" Hydrogen Peroxide says are necessary for class
certification are of a peculiar sort, such as a finding that common
questions will "predominate." On occasion, as with dueling experts, it
may be necessary to choose between competing evidentiary showings
to make such a finding. If the issues to be resolved to determine certi-
fication overlap with the merits that must be decided at trial, it may
seem that there is a risk of intruding on the right to jury trial. At least
some so argue.2 2 6
The Seventh Amendment argument is not persuasive. It may
have been sparked by mysterious invocations of the Seventh Amend-
ment in a 1999 Supreme Court rejection of a settlement class action,
but that Supreme Court comment surely does not apply to the situa-
tion in which certification is denied, whether or not the ground for
denial corresponds to an issue that would be presented at trial if ab-
sent class members filed their own suits. 22 7 As a starting point, then,
submitted was [sic] made part of the record and eight witnesses were subjected to direct and
cross-examination. The record before us consists of 10 volumes." Id. at 831.
225 See id. at 830 (quoting Doehler Metal Furniture Co. v. United States, 149 F.2d 130 (2d
Cir. 1945), the Judge Frank opinion that introduced the "slightest doubt" standard). A year
later, the Second Circuit rejected this attitude toward summary judgment. See Beal v. Lindsay,
468 F.2d 287, 291 (2d Cir. 1972); see also Heyman v. Commerce & Indus. Ins. Co., 524 F.2d 1317,
1319 (2d Cir. 1975).
226 See Kaufman & Wunderlich, supra note 14, at 357 (arguing that "this mini-trial on a
motion for class certification intrudes on plaintiffs' right to trial by jury"); Olson, supra note 14,
at 938 (arguing that, because certain issues Hydrogen Peroxide requires the court to resolve on
class certification are issues plaintiffs must prove at trial, plaintiffs have a constitutional right to a
jury decision of those issues).
227 In Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1999), the Court asserted that "certification
of a mandatory class followed by settlement of its action for money damages obviously impli-
cates the Seventh Amendment jury trial rights of absent class members." Id. at 845-46. It is
extremely difficult to determine what the Seventh Amendment problem would be. See Richard
L. Marcus, Benign Neglect Reconsidered, 148 U. PA. L. REv. 2009, 2031 n.11 2 (2000) (puzzling
over how a settlement could implicate the Seventh Amendment). In any event, at least it could
be said in that case that the absent class members would, if bound by a settlement, no longer
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the jury-trial rights of the absent class members cannot be imperiled
by a ruling that the case is not a proper class action. And the named
plaintiff is free to continue individually, jury-trial rights preserved. 22 8
An equally basic point is that the Seventh Amendment does not
require that the only way for there to be any judicial resolution of an
issue that might be presented at a jury trial be by jury decision.
Courts may have to resolve such issues as a pretrial matter when pass-
ing on procedural issues, such as class certification; the fact that the
issue is the same does not implicate the right to jury trial.
A simple example illustrates the point. Consider the cocon-
spirator exception to the hearsay rule as it operates in a criminal con-
spiracy case. To establish that a hearsay exception applies, the
proponent of evidence must, by a preponderance of the evidence,
show that the prerequisites for the exception have been established.
Under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E), those prerequisites in-
clude (1) that there was a conspiracy, (2) that defendant joined the
conspiracy, (3) that the declarant also joined the conspiracy, and
(4) that the statement was made during the course and in furtherance
of the conspiracy. Only when the court finds that these prerequisites
have been established may it admit the declarant's statement under
this exception. But if the substantive charge is conspiracy, that means
that the court must in effect find that defendant is guilty of conspiracy
(by a preponderance of the evidence) before admitting this evidence,
which the jury must evaluate, along with all the other evidence, in
determining whether defendant has been proved guilty of conspiracy
beyond a reasonable doubt. The judge does not, of course, tell the
jury that she has already concluded that defendant is guilty, albeit
have a right to present their cases to a jury. That concern does not arise if class certification is
denied. Surely the "right" to have one's case decided by a jury does not carry with it the right to
have a class in which one is a putative member certified so that a class action trial can be the
vehicle for such a jury decision.
228 See, for example, Alaska Electrical Pension Fund v. Flowserve Corp., 572 F.3d 221,
228-29 (5th Cir. 2009), in which the named plaintiff argued that his showing of "loss causation"
was sufficient and that a Rule 23 "finding" to the contrary at the class certification stage was
tantamount to granting summary judgment even though plaintiff had enough evidence to get to
the jury. The court explained that "[tihis argument fails because it conflates the issue of loss
causation for purposes of establishing predominance under Rule 23 with the issue of loss causa-
tion on the merits." Id. at 229. But as the court pointed out, "[t]he denial of class certification
does not prevent a plaintiff from proceeding individually. And 'the court's determination for
class certification purposes may be revised (or wholly rejected) by the ultimate factfinder."' Id.
(quoting Unger v. Amedisys, Inc., 401 F.3d 316, 323 (5th Cir. 2005)); see also Fener v. Operating
Eng'rs Constr. Indus., 579 F.3d 401, 407 (5th Cir. 2009) ("The proof needed for loss causation at
the pleadings stage should not be conflated with the requirements needed at the class certifica-
tion stage.").
365
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only by a preponderance of the evidence, and defendant's right to a
jury trial is preserved.
Similarly, in cases in which the judge grants class certification,
then, the judge's "finding" that the prerequisites for class certification
have been satisfied should not be revealed to the jury at trial and
should not limit the jury's power to decide the case according to the
Seventh Amendment. 229 Indeed, in this situation it is defendant's right
to jury trial that might be at risk if the judge's pretrial resolution of
overlapping issues were somehow to affect the jury's decision.
What is left, however, is a somewhat peculiar "finding." As the
Second Circuit tried to explain:
The finding that individual issues were likely to predominate
did not depend on an assessment of the validity of plaintiff's
claim or of the potential claims of other members of the pu-
tative class. Rather, the district court resolved an indepen-
dent fact question concerning the expected forms of proof in
light of the specific factual allegations contained in the
amended complaint. Some overlap with the ultimate review
on the merits is an acceptable collateral consequence of the
"rigorous analysis" that courts must perform when determin-
ing whether Rule 23's requirements have been met, so long
as it does not stem from a forbidden preliminary inquiry into
the merits.230
How exactly to make this sort of finding may be a challenge. One
district judge, presented with a report supporting class certification
from the same expert plaintiffs relied upon in Hydrogen Peroxide,
229 See, e.g., Gariety v. Grant Thornton, LLP, 368 F.3d 356 (4th Cir. 2004). As the court
explained there:
The jury or factfinder can be given free hand to find all of the facts required to
render a verdict on the merits, and if its finding on any fact differs from a finding
made in connection with class action certification, the ultimate factfinder's finding
on the merits will govern the judgment. A model for this process can be observed
in the context of the preliminary injunction practice. Courts make factual findings
in determining whether a preliminary injunction should issue, but those findings do
not bind the jury adjudging the merits, and the jury's findings on the merits govern
the judgment to be entered in the case.
Id. at 366. Hydrogen Peroxide made the same point: "Although the district court's findings for
the purpose of class certification are conclusive on that topic, they do not bind the fact-finder on
the merits." In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 318 (3d Cir. 2008); see also
In re New Motor Vehicles Canadian Exp. Litig., 522 F.3d 6, 24 (1st Cir. 2008) ("The judge's
consideration of merits issues at the class certification stage pertains only to that stage; the ulti-
mate factfinder, whether judge or jury, must still reach its own determination on these issues.").
230 Heerwagen v. Clear Channel Commc'ns, 435 F.3d 219, 232 (2d Cir. 2006) (citation
omitted).
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concluded that the situation was different because, in this case, the
expert had "actually presented an econometric model that purports to
show that antitrust impact is susceptible to common proof."231 But his
finding that this report sufficed seems not to make the sort of "find-
ing" that is called for:
Although the defense experts claim to dispute the feasibility
of constructing an econometric model using proof common
to the class, their reports are better characterized as disput-
ing the results of the plaintiffs' modeling. To resolve this dis-
pute would be to place myself in the role of the ultimate
factfinder by choosing which expert's econometric model is
"correct. "232
This judge's reluctance to make a factfinder's choice between the
competing experts arguably represents failure to scrutinize the show-
ing in the way Hydrogen Peroxide commands; in that case, the court of
appeals seemed to expect that the district judge would compare the
views of the defense and plaintiff experts and, one would think,
choose between them. 23 3 In that sense, it may assume that if the jury
is persuaded at trial that defendant's expert is right about common
proof of impact, that could imperil the entry of a judgment against the
class because lack of commonality does not prove that all class mem-
bers should lose, only that they should not all win. Since one goal of
certifying a class action is that the outcome will bind the class, win or
lose, that result might seem to defeat the purpose of the class action.
Requiring the district judge to make a "finding" about which expert is
right could be essential. That "finding" would not bind the jury, it is
true, but it would act as an effective screen against the risk that the
jury would conclude that proof of impact is not common compared
with some less stringent review on class certification. But it may be
that the need for such stringency overlooks another possibility. At
least in the employment discrimination area, the failure of a "class
claim" does not necessarily affect the possible later assertion of indi-
vidual claims by class members in the losing class.2 34 Similarly, in Hy-
231 In re Ethylene Propylene Diene Monomer (EPDM) Antitrust Litig., 256 F.R.D. 82, 102
n.11 (D. Conn. 2009).
232 Id. (emphasis added).
233 See Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 323-35.
234 See Cooper v. Fed. Reserve Bank, 467 U.S. 867, 880 (1984) (holding that, in a Title VII
action, judgment against the class on a "class claim" of pattern or practice of discrimination does
not foreclose later individual claims by class members based on a showing of actual discrimina-
tion against them).
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drogen Peroxide, a finding that there was no classwide impact might
not preclude individual claims based on individual impact.
But the core nature of the finding-unless it is on the "merits" of
what plaintiffs must prove-will continue to perplex. For some, that
perplexity results from the formulation of the predominance ques-
tion. 23 5 The Principles themselves seem to respond to this concern by
rephrasing the Rule 23(b)(3) standard to direct the judge to determine
whether to authorize a class action by asking whether resolution of a
common issue would "materially advance the resolution of multiple
civil claims by addressing the core of the dispute in a manner superior
to other realistic procedural alternatives, so as to generate significant
judicial efficiencies." 236 Frankly, this rephrasing seems a lot like what
knowledgeable judges have been trying to do under the current Rule
23(b)(3) standards, and rephrasing that effort appears unlikely to
make the task easier or clearer. It also probably will not materially
clarify the nature of the "findings" required.
D. Diminished Trial Court Discretion
From the beginning, it has been said that a trial court's decision
whether to certify a class depends on its exercise of discretion, and
courts still say so.2 37 But a findings requirement, and the sort of re-
235 See Allan Erbsen, From "Predominance" to "Resolvability": A New Approach to Regu-
lating Class Actions, 58 VAND. L. REv. 995 (2005):
[The predominance requirement] requires elaborate efforts to answer a question
that is not worth asking. . . . [S]imilarity among claims is an unhelpful concept
when one thinks about the practical consequences of certifying a class and the pro-
cedural principles (such as finality, fidelity, and feasibility) to which class adjudica-
tion should conform. . . . The predominance concept conflates the similarity and
dissimilarity inquiries into a single balancing test, thus obscuring the practical and
theoretical importance of dissimilarity standing alone. . . . The ensuing weighing
process is analogous to asking a starving person to balance the nutritional value of
vitamins in his only potential food source against the negative effects of poison in
the same food. Any sort of balancing would be pointless. A huge nutritional value
would be irrelevant if the poison is fatal, and if the poison is not fatal then any
amount of nutrition would justify consumption absent a superior alternative food
source.
Id. at 1005.
236 PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LYTIG. § 2.02(a)(1) (2010).
237 Thus, even while announcing a demanding standard for review of class certification mo-
tions in IPO, Judge Newman also observed:
The Rule 23 requirements differ from other threshold issues in that, once a district
court has ruled, the standard for appellate review is whether discretion has been
exceeded (or abused). This standard of review implies that a district judge has
some leeway as to Rule 23 requirements, and, unlike rulings as to jurisdiction, may
be affirmed in some circumstances for ruling either that a particular Rule 23 re-
quirement is met or is not met.
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view exhibited in Hydrogen Peroxide, hardly seem to fit that model.
Indeed, the whole notion may be unhelpful in describing the actual
role of district judges and courts of appeals. Long ago, Judge Friendly
emphasized the point:
Abuse of discretion can be found far more readily on appeals
from the denial or grant of class action status than where the
issue is, for example, the curtailment of cross-examination or
the grant or denial of a continuance. ... While no two cases
will be exactly alike, a court of appeals can no more tolerate
divergence by a district judge from the principles it has de-
veloped on this subject than it would under a standard of full
review-and this even though the district judge has adduced
what would be plausible grounds for his ruling if the issue
were arising the first time. ... [R]eview of class action deter-
minations for "abuse of discretion" does not differ greatly
from review for error.23 8
Certainly Hydrogen Peroxide was providing directions for district
judges to follow, not just hints for them to use in their "discretion."
And the role of appellate courts undoubtedly has increased since Rule
23(f) was added in 1998, permitting immediate review of grants or de-
nials of class certification. The very purpose of that Rule was to per-
mit a body of appellate caselaw to develop to focus and confine the
district courts' "discretion." The trend will continue.
Indeed, the whole notion of discretion under Rule 23 may need
reexamination. In Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates, P.A. v. All-
state Insurance Co., 2 3 9 the Supreme Court rejected an argument that a
state statute forbidding class actions for suits based on legislation cre-
ating penalties, unless the penalty statute explicitly authorized class
actions, should be applied in a federal court suit seeking class certifi-
cation for such claims.240 The lower court had found that the state
statute did not conflict with Rule 23 because it addressed whether a
given state-law claim was "eligible" for class treatment.24 1 The Court
rejected this argument, finding that Rule 23 "creates a categorical rule
entitling a plaintiff whose suit meets the specified criteria to pursue his
IPO, 471 F.3d 24, 40 (2d Cir. 2006).
238 Abrams v. Interco, Inc., 719 F.2d 23, 28 (2d Cir. 1983). For somewhat contemporary
musings by Judge Friendly about discretionary rulings, see Henry J. Friendly, Indiscretion About
Discretion, 31 EMORY L.J. 747 (1982).
239 Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431 (2010).
240 Id. at 1437-38.
241 Id. at 1437.
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claim as a class action." 24 2 It emphatically rejected defendant's argu-
ment that the district court had some discretion about whether to cer-
tify a class:
Allstate asserts that Rule 23 neither explicitly nor implicitly
empowers a federal court "to certify a class in each and every
case" where the Rule's criteria are met. But that is exactly
what Rule 23 does: It says that if the prescribed precondi-
tions are satisfied "[a] class action may be maintained" . . . -
not "a class action may be permitted." Courts do not main-
tain actions; litigants do. The discretion suggested by Rule
23's "may" is discretion residing in the plaintiff.2 43
True, this discussion is not about whether the requirements of
Rule 23 are satisfied, but it nonetheless makes the idea of discretion in
application of the Rule less plausible.
E. More Frequent Settlement Class Certifications
Under amended Rule 23(e), the responsibilities borne by the
court in reviewing a proposed settlement of a class action are consid-
erable, and the judge's performance of those duties is subject to re-
view at the behest of any objecting class member. Litigants and
judges contemplating settlement of a class action will have work to do.
In one sense, Hydrogen Peroxide may facilitate that process.
Often the question whether plaintiff counsel have had adequate access
to discovery is problematical when they are telling the judge that the
deal they reached is a good deal for the class. There is an obvious
reason to worry about "an instance of the unscrupulous leading the
blind." 244 But as the prior discovery boundary between "merits" and
"class" issues breaks down, 24 5 there will be less occasion for worry
about whether plaintiff lawyers are indeed going into the negotiations
blind. To the contrary, they should have been amassing the sort of
evidence that would enable them to evaluate the merits in order to
present their class certification motion.
More generally, however, the additional difficulties that the class
certification process erects for plaintiffs, and the prospect of probing
appellate review if the class is certified, must encourage plaintiff law-
242 Id.
243 Id. at 1438.
244 In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig., 643 F.2d 195, 211 (5th Cir. 1981).
245 See supra text accompanying note 83; see also Beach v. Healthways, Inc., 264 F.R.D.
360, 363 (M.D. Tenn. 2010) (denying defendants' motion to postpone "merits discovery" until
after class certification).
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yers to look more longingly at settlement. Perhaps the settlement
route to certification will avoid the demanding findings of certification
for litigation. The Third Circuit has recently stated that the rigors of
Hydrogen Peroxide do not apply to review of settlement-class
certification:
Unlike in In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litigation,
where the certification inquiry was set against the backdrop
of an impending trial, here we are not as concerned with
"formulat[ing] some prediction" as to how this element of a
Sherman Act violation would "play out" at trial, "for the
proposal is that there be no trial," and instead our inquiry
into the element of antitrust injury is solely for the purpose
of ensuring that issues common to the class predominate
over individual ones. 246
For those who regard settlements as favored outcomes, this is a
welcome prospect. But for those who are unnerved by asking judges
to perform the tasks that they must shoulder to review settlements,
rather than the more familiar job of making the "findings" required by
Hydrogen Peroxide, it may be less welcome. Moreover, it is somewhat
difficult to square this reasoning with the emphasis on predominance
in Amchem itself, for the Supreme Court ruled there that the pro-
posed settlement-class certification failed the predominance test.2 47
But to the extent that predominance is an obstacle even in the settle-
ment-class context, it is likely that lawyers will shift attention to non-
class aggregate settlements, as Professor Sherman has recently
noted.248
246 In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 579 F.3d 241, 269 (3d Cir. 2009) (citations
omitted).
247 In Amchem, the Court emphasized that the proposed settlement failed the predomi-
nance test. See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 622-25 (1997). But this discus-
sion may be off point, since it was about the "cohesiveness" of the class there, and meant to
emphasize that "[n]o settlement class called to our attention is as sprawling as this one." Id. at
624. It may be that the function of predominance in that case was to underscore the class con-
flicts that mainly concerned the Court, and that a relaxed view of predominance in other cases
could be justified in the settlement context where it would not suffice for a litigation class that
had to show how to try the case. The Court did note as well that "[p]redominance is a test
readily met in certain cases alleging consumer or securities fraud or violations of the antitrust
laws." Id. at 625.
248 See Edward F. Sherman, The MDL Model for Resolving Complex Litigation if a Class
Action Is Not Possible, 82 TUL. L. REV. 2205, 2223 (2008).
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CONCLUSION
In a number of ways, Eisen has seemed a wrong turn in class ac-
tion law, particularly by scaring judges away from addressing the mer-
its while passing on class certification. Perhaps the Court was trying
only to make certification more difficult for plaintiffs to obtain,24 9 but
its decision had effects far beyond that for a generation. Those effects
are little felt now, and will likely be felt even less in the future. Pro-
fessor Molot has effectively stated the general problem that Hydrogen
Peroxide illustrates:
The central dilemma in contemporary civil procedure is not
whether judges should cling to their traditional role or else
abandon it for a completely new one, but how judges should
respond to new challenges and whether judges can do so
without losing sight of their core institutional competence
and constitutional role.2 50
Gatekeeping about aggregation is a traditional role of judges.
With class actions, it had often involved scrutinizing and evaluating
the "merits" when they bore on whether aggregation should be al-
lowed. The 1966 amendment brought new focus on the class certifica-
tion decision by insisting that it be made early, and the expansion of
class action activity produced by the new Rule magnified the impor-
tance of that decision. But Eisen seemed to deprive judges of author-
ity to bring their traditional decisionmaking capacities to bear on that
decision whenever an issue overlapped with the "merits." Restoring
authority to make such judgments is easier to justify in terms of
judges' core institutional competence than the expansion of judges'
responsibilities to include many tasks-including tasks in managing
class actions-that they must also undertake.
In terms of Professor Molot's criteria, the recent shift toward
merits scrutiny at the class certification stage is a positive develop-
ment. We will not soon exempt judges from performing the tasks for
which their traditional roles may inadequately equip them, 251 but at
249 See George Rutherglen, Title VII Class Actions, 47 U. CHI. L. REv. 688, 731-32 (1980)
(speculating that in Eisen the Court was not generally opposed to merits scrutiny, and would
welcome merits scrutiny that "would protect defendants from unwarranted certification of class
actions").
250 Molot, supra note 15, at 74.
251 A possible example is the high-profile review by Judge Rakoff (of the Southern District
of New York) of a proposed settlement of an SEC action against Bank of America, which the
judge reluctantly approved after first rejecting a different settlement. See Louise Story, Bank's
Deal with S.E.C. Is Approved, N.Y. TiMEs, Feb. 23, 2010, at Bl.
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least they will have more latitude to perform this task within their
core institutional competence.
If that is a happy conclusion, it nonetheless comes with potential
consequences that may unnerve some. The additional work that mer-
its scrutiny portends is not itself unnerving; it should yield more thor-
ough analysis of these important questions. The prospect that fewer
classes will be certified may not be realized. But if fewer classes are
certified, that result is not particularly unnerving, assuming the addi-
tional work produces more reliable certification decisions. The Sev-
enth Amendment problem that some have raised due to the
"findings" requirement seems groundless, but the nature of the find-
ing will be perplexing whether or not there is a semantic change in the
articulation of what is needed for class certification. District courts
will have less latitude if courts of appeals-wielding their new power
for interlocutory review of class certification decisions-become more
exacting in performing that review, but that is unnerving only if one
concludes that court of appeals decisions are less reliable than district
court decisions. Of all the seeming consequences, then, the one that is
most troubling is that there will be even more settlement-class than
litigation-class certifications. Ironically, that development will require
judges to do more of the sort of activity that seems less suited to their
core institutional competence. 2 52 As Professor Resnik put it a genera-
tion ago, "[t]he history of procedure is a series of attempts to solve the
problems created by the preceding generation's procedural re-
forms." 253 Perhaps the solution to the problems wrought by Eisen will
prove this adage yet again.
252 See supra text accompanying notes 138-46 (discussing judicial review of class action
settlements).
253 Judith Resnik, Tiers, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 837, 1030 (1984).
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